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This study examines the impact of incarceration, or coercive mobility, on concentrated 
disadvantage, testing an essential component of the theoretical model proposed by Todd Clear 
and Dina Rose (1998) and elaborated by Clear (2007).  These authors argue that while 
concentrated economic disadvantage may lead to high crime rates, chronically high rates of 
incarceration may operate as a type of “coercive mobility,” exacerbating concentrated 
disadvantage and increasing crime rates, especially in high-minority urban communities. The 
study also examines the importance of religious congregations, as a measure of community 
social capital, which may moderate the relationship between coercive mobility and concentrated 
disadvantage. Theoretically, the effect of coercive mobility should be greater in urban areas, and 
smaller in areas where the number of religious congregations is high. I test these relationships 
using county-level data in 2000 and 2010 on prison admissions and releases from the National 
Corrections Reporting Program, social and economic indicators from the Census, and the number 
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A. Mass Incarceration in the U.S. 
Over the past four decades, the U.S. has experienced unprecedented growth in the prison 
population and the population under correctional control (Blumstein and Beck 1999; Western 
2006; Garland 2001). A Pew Center on the States report finds that 1 in 100 Americans are 
incarcerated at any given time, and 1 in 45 Americans are on probation or parole (2009). 
Combined, these numbers indicate that 1 in 31 persons in the population are under some form of 
correctional supervision (Pew Center on the States 2009). This means that more than 2 million 
individuals are either in prison or jail, and over 5 million people are under community 
supervision via probation or parole (Pew Center on the States 2009).  
Moreover, incarceration rates are disproportionate. Research finds significant racial and 
ethnic disparities in the use of imprisonment, as well as general involvement in the criminal 
justice system (Western 2006; Blumstein and Beck 1999; Bridges and Crutchfield 1988; Kent 
and Jacobs 2005; Kramer and Steffensmeir 1993; Spohn and Holleran 2000). Specifically, 
African American men are imprisoned at rates 7 times higher than any other racial/ethnic group 
(Western 2006). African American adults are four times more likely than whites and 2.5 times 
more likely than Hispanics to be under correctional supervision (Pew Center on the States 2009). 
Nearly one-third of African American men will be incarcerated at some point in their life (Smith 
& Hattery, 2008; Western, 2006). 
There is also consistent evidence of disproportionality with regard to level of education, 
socioeconomic status, gender, age, and employment status. Some suggest that multiple sources 
of disproportionately can act to generate substantial cumulative disparity (Western 2006; Clear 
2007). For example, educational disparity among the prison population is particularly profound. 
1 
 
Western found that the average state inmate has less than eleven years of schooling, and earned 
lower wages than non-incarcerated men with the same education (2006). Considering the 
combined effects of race and low educational attainment, it is not surprising that 60 percent of 
black, male high school dropouts born during or after the 1960s were incarcerated by the early 
2000s (Western 2006). By the late 1990s, 30 percent of young black men without a college 
education were incarcerated. Furthermore, the majority of individuals incarcerated over the past 
forty years are minority men of an extremely disadvantaged class background (Clear 2007; 
Fagan et al. 2003; Lynch and Sabol 2004b; Western 2006; Beckett and Western 2001; Clear et 
al. 2001; Freeman 2000; Roberts 2004). Several studies have discussed how the combination of 
disparities across demographic characteristics place some groups at acute societal disadvantage, 
such that “the effects of harsh penal policies in the past 40 years have fallen most heavily on 
blacks and Hispanics, especially the poorest” (National Research Council 2014). 
What are the consequences of such high rates of incarceration for demographically 
concentrated communities? Criminologists consistently find that areas with high rates of 
residential instability, weak family and community ties, and high rates of unemployment 
correspond to high rates of violence and crime in general (Clear et al. 2001; Sampson, 
Raudenbush, and Earls 1997). Violence and crime are no doubt important influences on 
incarceration rates. However, some recent research has also recognized that while community-
level disadvantage (as a predictor of crime) may lead to high rates of incarceration, chronic high 
rates of incarceration may perpetuate and/or exacerbate macro-level disadvantage. Empirical 
investigations can help identify the mechanisms through which high rates of incarceration 
deplete communities’ ability to combat crime and poverty, and ultimately steer already 
struggling neighborhoods toward disadvantage entrenchment.   
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B. The Current Study 
The goal of the current study is to examine the macro-level impact of incarceration. I 
review the literature regarding mass incarceration and the negative consequences of incarceration 
for individuals, families, and networks. I then review research outlining how the spatial 
concentration of incarceration can be particularly deleterious for communities. I discuss 
criminological explanations as to the relationship between community characteristics and crime. 
I draw on these ideas and recent research regarding the negative consequences of incarceration, 
outlining how high levels of incarceration not only increase crime, but contribute to a cycle of 
increasing disadvantage and derive several relevant hypotheses. Using data from the years 2000 
and 2010 and taken from the National Corrections Reporting Program for years, the Census, the 
Uniform Crime Report, and the Religious Congregations and Membership Study, I test my 
predictions and present related findings. I conclude with a summary of my findings and a 
discussion of these findings with regard to both the research literature and social context more 
broadly. 
II. Theoretical Framework 
Research finds that the majority of the most disadvantaged segments of the population 
reside in similar spaces, thus forming communities characterized by high levels of poverty, high 
levels of female headed households, low rates of educational attainment, and high rates of 
joblessness. The communities characterized by these “concentration effects” are prone to occur 
in urban inner cities (Clear 2007; Drakulich, Crutchfield, Ross, and Rose 2012). Clear and 
colleagues argue that these communities also correspond to high rates of crime, and given the 
recent trend in punishment, the highest rates of incarceration (2007; Sampson and Loeffler 
2010).  In other words, not only does mass incarceration disproportionality impact a specific 
3 
 
group, but mass imprisonment is also spatially concentrated in urban locations (Clear 2007; 
Fagan, West, Holland 2003; Sampson and Loeffler 2010; Western 2006). Several neighborhood-
level and macro-level analyses find evidence of this relationship (Fagan et al. 2003; Clear 2007; 
Lynch and Sabol 2004b; Sampson and Loeffler 2010).  
Rose and Clear (1998) proposed that high rates of incarceration concentrated in specific 
spatial units could be another destabilizing factor associated with disorganization, and resulting 
in even higher rates of crime. Moreover, they suggest that the forced removal of relatively large 
segments of community populations through incarceration has the same destabilizing effect as 
high rates of residential mobility. This hypothesis, later coined as the coercive mobility thesis, 
states that destabilization of communities occurs in two ways: removal and reentry (1998). Much 
like Bursik and Grasmick’s argument, discussed below, that high rates of residential instability 
are particularly detrimental to the formation of social control, Rose and Clear argue that 
incarceration is coerced mobility that undermines the crime reducing functions of informal social 
control (1998; Clear, Rose, Waring, and Scully 2003; Clear 2007). Removal of relatively large 
proportions of the population damages social networks within the community, which potentially 
limits networks outside of the community. Broken networks lead to less attachment between 
community members and attachment to the community itself.  
 In order to fully understand the theoretical framework proposed by Rose and Clear 
(1998), it is necessary to review the fundamental components of social disorganization theory 
proposed by Shaw and McKay (1942/2009). Studies of the effect of environment on criminality 
often rely on Shaw and McKay’s social disorganization theory (1942/2009). Using the 
breakdown of the city found in the Park and Burgess’ concentric zone model, Shaw and McKay 
found that inner city areas were characterized by high poverty levels, high rates of residential 
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mobility, and high levels of racial/ethnic heterogeneity (thus different cultural backgrounds). 
These areas were also associated with higher rates of crime (Shaw and McKay 1942/2009). In 
studying the differences in communities, Shaw and McKay came to the conclusion that 
delinquency was not a product of the inhabitants, rather crime is a product of poor community 
organization and weak social controls. 
There are several elements that contribute to the lack of community organization (Shaw 
and McKay 1942/2009). In addition to the characteristics stated above, community 
disorganization in lower income areas is also a product of competing value systems (Shaw and 
McKay 1942/2009). Conventional value systems are mostly uniform in areas of high economic 
status. However, in areas of low economic status, traditional morals and values are dominant, but 
such values are in competition with a delinquent value system. Shaw and McKay also discuss the 
lack of “philanthropic agencies and institutions” that are designed to help with local issues 
(1942/2009:90). Because these areas are plagued by high rates of poverty, institutions that are 
funded by local taxes also suffer. Thus, the informal controls provided by schools, as well as the 
sense of community cohesion provided by well cared for parks and city property is severely 
hindered. Furthermore, community disorganization prevents effective community social control, 
thus contributing to higher rates of crime (Shaw and McKay 1942/2009). The effects of weak 
social control combined with disorganization results in a community’s inability to reach 
“approximate unanimity” on the recognition of common problems, as well as the solution to 
those problems (Shaw & McKay 1942/2009:90).  
Bursik and Grasmick expand on these ideas by conceptualizing a systemic theory of 
crime and an explanation of community social control (1993). They divide community social 
control into three components: private, parochial, and public. Private controls are informal 
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controls between intimate groups, such as family and close friends. These controls are exercised 
through social support, and condemnation or threat of exclusion from the group. Parochial 
controls are informal community controls that occur between residents and local institutions such 
as schools, churches, stores, and voluntary organizations. Parochial controls also refer to 
relationships between neighbors who lack the intimate attachment found in the private order of 
control. The final form of control, public control, refers to (1) a community’s ability to access 
outside agencies, such as “municipal service bureaucracies,” to secure resources and (2) the 
relationship between the community and the local police department (Bursik and Grasmick 
1993:17). Bursik and Grasmick state that each form of control develops over time through 
community level social interaction (1993).  
However, interaction among neighborhood residents is less likely in communities 
characterized by high levels of residential instability. The frequent influx and outflow of local 
residents impede the formation of long term social networks. This, in turn, limits the 
community’s capacity to exert and maintain social control that ultimately reduces the risk of 
crime.  
Sampson and Wilson discussed the ways in which cumulative disadvantage is spatially 
concentrated in minority communities (1995). They emphasize social structural characteristics 
that create residential inequality in specific areas. One explanation for concentrated disadvantage 
is the social transformation of the inner city. Moreover, this transformation was a result of macro 
structural changes, such as the deindustrialization of inner cities, white-flight, and the exodus of 
middle class black families. All of these factors drastically impacted the economy of these areas, 
thus social institutions that require the financial stability of a regular economic system (schools, 
parks, churches, stores, restaurants, etc.) were substantially weakened from this process. The 
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transformation of the inner city resulted in concentrated disadvantage, or neighborhoods 
characterized by high rates of poverty, single parent households, joblessness, and low levels of 
education. In brief, “macrosocial forces (e.g. segregation, migration, housing discrimination, 
structural transformation of the economy) interact with local community-level factors (e.g. 
residential turnover, concentrated poverty, family disruption) to impede social organization” 
(Sampson and Wilson 1995:49). 
The deterioration of inner cities combined with the disproportionate impact that this had 
on black communities furthered their social isolation. Furthermore, Sampson and Wilson state 
that the relationship between race and crime is evident when looking at the concentration of 
African Americans in areas characterized by structural social disorganization and cultural social 
isolation. Structural social disorganization refers to the lack of informal and formal social 
networks in a community. Cultural social isolation refers to the notion that these communities 
are cut off, or isolated, from mainstream culture. 
Social networks are a way for communities to exercise social controls and build human 
and social capital. Similar to Bursik and Grasmick’s discussion of the production of private 
control, informal networks include ties to family and friends, trust, and mutual feelings of 
unanimity. Formal networks refer to social institutions and participation in those institutions, 
which fits the requirements for parochial control (Bursik and Grasmick 1993). Combined, these 
networks result in community cohesion and “collective supervision that the community directs 
towards local problems,” or collective efficacy (Sampson and Wilson 1995:45; Sampson et al. 
1997).  
Relatedly, Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls outline the mechanisms by which elements 
of community level disorganization (high levels of poverty, residential instability, and 
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racial/ethnic heterogeneity) drives individual level behavior (1997).  Sampson et al. present the 
concept of “collective efficacy,” or the “differential ability of neighborhoods to realize the 
common values of residents and maintain effective social controls” (1997: 918). According to 
Sampson et al., the rate of violence in areas characterized by high levels of concentrated 
disadvantage (poverty, residential instability, female headship, and joblessness) is largely 
mediated by collective efficacy (1997). In other words, disorganization contributes to the 
absence of informal and formal social controls, thus resulting in neighborhood residents’ 
inability to produce collective efficacy. However, the formation of this community-level 
unanimity strongly mediates the impact of concentrated disadvantage/disorganization on violent 
crime rates. 
In sum, these theories and theoretical contributions offer insight into the ecological 
factors of crime production. Socially disorganized communities lack the ability to exert informal 
social controls and collective efficacy to effectively resist crime. Therefore, crime is 
concentrated in areas characterized by acute disadvantage. These disorganized neighborhoods 
are disproportionately poor and nonwhite. The extreme disadvantage these communities suffer 
makes them susceptible to high rates of crime.  
III. The Effect of Incarceration on Crime 
Clear and other scholars draw on explanations of the spatial concentration of crime to 
focus on the criminogenic effects of the spatial concentration of incarceration (2007; Fagan et al. 
2003; Lynch and Sabol 2004b; Frost and Gross 2012). In this regard, social disorganization 
theory, and related concepts, provide insight into how high rates of incarceration can contribute 
to community-level disadvantage and higher rates of crime. Recent studies have suggested that 
the damage done to communities, specifically, urban minority communities, by concentrated 
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incarceration are vast and penetrate many aspects of community organization. Indeed, rather than 
alleviating crime, scholars contend that perpetually high rates of incarceration make 
disadvantaged communities worse. 
The stigmatization and resultant hardships associated with incarceration and the 
additional isolation of that family and/or close friends of offenders/ex-offenders diminishes 
community integration and social cohesion (Clear et al. 2001; Roberts 2004; Clear 2007; Rose, 
Clear, and Ryder 2001; Rose and Clear 2002; Drakulich et al. 2012). With weakened inter-
community networking, the entire community can become characterized as a “problem” place; 
residents in these neighborhoods struggle to build trust with other residents and maintain a pro-
social identity (Clear 2007; Clear et al. 2001). 
Intra-community networks, or larger networks that the community has with outsiders, are 
also severely damaged by concentrated incarceration (Clear 2007; Rose et al. 2001, Clear et al. 
2001). The stigma of being a “problem” place prevents businesses needed for jobs from opening 
in these areas. The prevention of new business and new residents further isolates and 
disadvantages an already poorly resourced area. Clearly, this limits opportunities for both law-
abiding and ex-offenders to find employment.  
Members of the incarcerated population may have previously occupied important familial 
roles as primary earners, financial contributors, and/or caretakers. Many may have had important 
community networks that he or she and his/her family relied on to be active neighborhood 
participants. Given that the majority of offenders were legally employed prior to arrest, it is 
likely that they not only contributed financially to their family, but also to their community 
(Glaze and Maruschak 2008). These individuals most likely buy goods that generate sales tax 
revenue and support local business. In brief, offenders are likely to “represent both assets and 
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liabilities to their communities,” and portraying them as one or the other misses the larger picture 
of the real impact that the justice system has on poor communities (Rose and Clear 1998:452). 
Incarceration also impacts individual and community assessments of formal social 
controls (Rose and Clear 2004). Moreover, the perceived relationship between the criminal 
justice system and community residents of high incarceration places is a partial product of the 
amount of criminal justice intervention in these places. The system loses legitimacy in high 
incarceration areas because these residents feel that they are targeted unfairly (Clear 2008). 
However, Clear et al. finds evidence that community residents appreciate the removal of certain 
offenders, and respect the reinforcement of legal norms though criminal justice intervention 
(2001; Clear 2007). Although the legitimacy of the system is threatened through the overuse of 
incarceration, the intended effects of the criminal justice system are not lost on this group.  
Annually, over 600,000 inmates are released back into their prior communities, while 
presumably similar proportions of residents are admitted to prison from these communities as 
well (Freeman 2003; Mears, Wang, Hay, and Bales 2008; Kubrin and Stewart 2006; Hipp and 
Yates 2009; Hannon and DeFina 2010). The excessive use of incarceration has forced 
communities into a continuous pattern of coercive mobility due to prison cycling, “or the 
ongoing process of admission to and release from imprisonment of offending populations” (Frost 
and Gross 2012:465).  
Relatedly, this process results in the transmission of prison culture to public life (Roberts 
2004; Hagan and Dinovitzer 1999). Continual prison cycling has important potential 
consequences for adolescents growing up in areas where norms alternate between “the code of 
the street” and traditional “decent” norms (Anderson 1994). Rose and Clear note that these 
communities contend with heterogeneity of norms and values (1998).  
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Empirical studies find evidence of the above relationships. Because incarceration 
disproportionately impacts extremely disadvantaged areas, the pattern of incarceration has 
become an ecological feature of the community in some places (Clear 2007; Sampson and 
Loeffler 2010; Fagan et al. 2003; Roberts 2004). In studying the reciprocal effects of 
incarceration in New York neighborhoods, Fagan et al. found that not only was incarceration 
clustered in the poorest neighborhoods, but also that jail admission for drug arrests increased 
over time despite declining crime rates (2003). This finding suggests that jail admissions have 
become a social ecological factor in poor communities.  Relatedly, Roberts suggests that the 
concentration of incarceration in disadvantaged areas has distorted social norms resulting in lack 
of consensus on common values (Roberts 2004). 
Greenberg and West find evidence of similar issues at the macro level (2001). In a 
national analysis looking at variations in imprisonment rates, Greenberg and West found that the 
relationship between crime and imprisonment rates was not consistently linear, or in the expected 
direction (2001). Furthermore, decreases in the property crime rate from 1981 to 1991 predicted 
increases in imprisonment rates by state, but this relationship did not reach statistical 
significance. There was a slight positive relationship between change in the violent crime rate in 
1981 to 1991 and imprisonment rates, but again, this relationship was not statistically significant.  
Greenberg and West also found that some of the strongest predictors of variation in state 
imprisonment rates were economic. More specifically, unemployment in 1981 predicted an 
increase in imprisonment rates in 1991. Change in the amount of welfare spending from 1981 to 
1991 was negatively related to imprisonment rates, meaning that as welfare spending decreased 
in this time period while imprisonment rates increased. A positive relationship was observed for 
state revenue and imprisonment rates, suggesting that increases in state revenues from 1981 to 
11 
 
1991 also predicted increases in imprisonment rates in 1991. These relationships provide 
evidence that not only do cultural norms that impact imprisonment rates change at the 
neighborhood level as proposed by Clear (2007), but significant change also occurs at the macro 
level.  
The ongoing removal and reentry process destabilizes communities by interrupting social 
networks and breaking down mechanisms of informal social control, thus leading to more crime. 
Clear et al. found that prison admission in one year did not have a strong effect on crime rates the 
following year, but “after a certain concentration of residents are removed from the community 
through incarceration, the effect of additional admissions is to increase, not decrease, crime,” 
suggesting a nonlinear relationship (2001:55).  Hipp and Yates found that although rates of 
returning parolees have a significant and positive relationship with aggravated assault and 
burglary rates, social capital, measured as the number of voluntary organizations in the 
neighborhood, moderated this effect (2009). 
Relatedly, Hannon and Defina found that not only is reentry significant and positively 
related to violent crime, but the interaction of unemployment and reentry is significant predictor 
of violent crime (2010). In other words, the effect of large numbers of entering ex-offenders on 
crime is strongest when the unemployment rate increases. The reentry of ex-offenders was not 
the major contributor of later crime; rather concentrated reentry into economically deprived 
places was found to be the strongest predictor of later crime.  
Mears et al. reported that resource deprivation is a significant predictor of recidivism for 
young nonwhites, and Kubrin and Stewart found that neighborhood disadvantage (poverty, 
unemployment, median family income, proportion of residents on public assistance) is also 
significant and positively related to recidivism (2008; 2006).  
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In sum, these studies indicate that ecological characteristics such as economic deprivation 
and associated neighborhood disorganization are strong predictors of present and future crime 
and incarceration rates. In the following paragraphs, I summarize literature on the impact of 
incarceration for individuals and families. While much of this work relies on individual and 
meso-level outcomes, they nonetheless suggest the mechanisms through which having 
substantial proportions of incarcerated persons in a given jurisdiction can have substantial 
immediate and long-term impacts on community well-being. That is, they discuss the ways in 
which prolonged periods of high (and accelerating) rates of incarceration may perpetuate and 
exacerbate macro-level disadvantage. 
IV. The Effect of Incarceration on Disadvantage: Individuals 
Research finds that average inmate possesses fewer forms of human capital than non-
offenders (Freeman 2000; Western 2006). Human capital refers to an individual’s knowledge, 
skills, and ability to “compete in the marketplace” (Clear 2007:80). Moreover, inmates are more 
likely to have lower test scores in school and have fewer years of education, thus the majority of 
the incarcerated population is already disadvantaged due to low skill and low levels of education. 
Thus, African American men face significant human capital deficits. They are the population 
most likely to be incarcerated (young, low skill, minority men), and find employment in the 
secondary labor market, which provides fewer opportunities for secure long-term employment 
(Western 2006; Freeman 2000; Freeman 2003). In other words, the employment options for this 
group are limited to mostly low skill jobs and minimal wages prior to incarceration.  
The challenges of incarceration exceed the amount of time an inmate spends behind bars, 
and seeps into nearly every aspect of daily life post incarceration. The stigma associated with a 
criminal conviction is especially harmful for individuals both while incarcerated and, more 
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importantly, after release from prison. In prison, the individual is stripped of his or her identity, 
which is then replaced by a number. Upon release, the individual may struggle to reclaim his or 
her identity. Issues with personal identity, or lack thereof, are associated with low feelings of 
self-worth (Clear 2007; Clear et al. 2001). Moreover, feelings of self-worth and personal identity 
are paramount in order to thrive socially, especially in finding a job and reintegrating back into 
society. 
The stigma of a criminal record is arguably the greatest challenge that ex-inmates face 
when searching for employment (Western 2000; 2002; 2006; Freeman 2000; 2003; Huebner 
2005; Western and Pettit 2000). Simply put, employers are less likely to hire ex-offenders 
(Freeman 2003). Employers view a criminal conviction as a sign of untrustworthiness; studies 
find that ex-offenders are less likely to be hired than those without a criminal record despite 
controlling for similar demographic characteristics (Western 2006; Freeman 2003). The stigma 
of a criminal record especially limits access to career jobs (Western 2002). Career jobs boost 
human and social capital, or “the capacity of a person to call upon personal ties (usually within 
social networks) in order to advance some personal interest,” through the development of weak 
ties (Clear 2007:80). This limitation has serious consequences based on the well-established link 
between gainful employment and desistance from crime (Sampson and Laub 1990).  
While incarcerated, the few networks that are available to inmates are primarily criminal 
networks, thus the opportunity to build legitimate social capital through networking is limited if 
not non-existent. Furthermore, incarceration severs ties to previous job networks due to the 
stigma of conviction, as well as the total removal from the job market. There is little opportunity 
to maintain ties to previous employers, and virtually no chance to create employment ties while 
imprisoned or when subsequently released.  
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Incarceration also directly impacts the attainment of job skills and experience. Due to 
time lost to incarceration, ex-offenders have less of the job skills acquired through work 
experience (Freeman 2003; Western 2002). In other words, the ability for the individual to build 
necessary human capital in order to succeed in the market place is severely undermined by 
incarceration. In addition, Freeman finds that a disproportionate number of ex-inmates report 
mental and/or physical disabilities that further hinder their ability to find work after being 
released (2003). Some of these conditions include learning disabilities, and drug and alcohol 
addiction. It is also possible that time spent in prison may worsen preexisting mental and/or 
physical issues thus exacerbating cumulative disadvantage (Western 2002).  
Thus, it is not surprising that incarceration also limits wage earnings over the life-course 
for ex-offenders (Western 2006; Western 2002). Western found that, after controlling for 
individual level characteristics and differences in work experience, ex-inmates earn 
approximately 16 percent less than men who have not been incarcerated (2002). Moreover, 
incarceration reduces wage growth, meaning that “the wage gap between nonconvicts and ex-
convicts grows as workers age” (Western 2002: 538). Overall, incarceration accounts for a 30 to 
40 percent reduction in potential earnings over the life course for ex-offenders (Western 2006).  
V. The Effect of Incarceration on Disadvantage: Family and Children 
Incarceration has been shown to impede aspects of family formation (Western and 
Wildeman 2009; Lynch and Sabol 2004a; Western 2006). Because ex-offenders are less likely to 
obtain stable long-term employment, they are also less likely to be considered suitable 
marriageable partners (Western 2006; Western and Wildeman 2009; Huebner 2005). Huebner 
found that prior incarceration reduced the odds of marriage by 8 percent (2005: 294). 
Furthermore, incarcerated men in their twenties are half as likely to be married as non-offenders 
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(Western and Wildeman 2009; Western 2006). Rates of marriage for African Americans are 
especially low in comparison to other racial/ethnic groups, as the gender ratio of marriageable 
men to marriageable women is increasingly skewed by the increased use of incarceration 
(Western 2006).  
Maintaining ties to family and strong social networks while in prison can help secure 
one’s sense of identity, but telephone privileges are quite costly, and it is not uncommon for a 
prisoner to be held hours away from his or her kinship networks. For example, Mumola found 
that the majority of state prisoners are housed in facilities that are over 100 miles away from 
their children (2000).  Prisoners also report feelings of insecurity and mistrust regarding their 
relationships with loved ones on the outside (Western 2006). They worry that their spouse will 
find another partner to fill the void of their absence. Again, the barriers of communication 
between prisoners and their loved ones can harm familial bonds and important social and 
informal networks.  
Parental incarceration can have serious negative implications for the development of the 
child’s human and social capital. Despite low marriage rates among inmates, inmates are just as 
likely as non-offenders to have children. A report released by the Bureau of Justice Statistics in 
2008 found that over 50 percent of state inmates and over 60 percent of federal inmates had 
minor children (Glaze and Maruschak 2008). Furthermore, nearly 44 percent of male prisoners 
with children and over 60 percent of female prisoners with children report living with their 
children prior to being incarcerated. This report revealed that nearly 2 million children in the 
U.S. have at least one incarcerated parent (Glaze and Maruschak 2008). The growing number of 




VI. The Effect of Incarceration on Disadvantage: Implications for Communities 
Research suggests that approximately 95 percent of the incarcerated population is 
expected to return to society, and majority of these offenders will return to the community where 
they lived prior to arrest (Freeman 2003; Petersilia 2003). Incarceration reduces the likelihood of 
meaningful employment for ex-offenders, which at the community level, is related to fewer 
marriages and increases in female headed households (Lynch and Sabol 2004b, Western 2006). 
Clear identified four common themes that characterize the main negative consequences of 
incarceration on communities: stigma, financial, identity, and relationships (2007; 2008; Clear et 
al. 2001). 
The concentration of incarceration in disadvantaged areas means that multiple individuals 
and families struggle with this stigma in the community. Lynch and Sabol found that the number 
of at-risk individuals in prison ranged from 0 to 276 out of 1000 residents per neighborhood in 
Baltimore, MA, meaning that anywhere from 0 to 27.6 percent of the at-risk population was 
incarcerated in a given neighborhood (the average was 3.5 percent) (2004b). However, according 
to Clear et al.’s analysis of the impacts of high incarceration neighborhoods in Tallahassee, FL 
incarceration is not openly discussed, and families often isolate themselves from previous social 
networks to avoid the stigmatization (2001).  
The stigma of incarceration also increases the likelihood of residents moving elsewhere, 
and as residents move out they tend to sell their property for any amount offered to them 
resulting in less value in the economy through the diminishing worth in the local housing market 
(Clear 2007). According to the respondents in Clear’s analysis, this reflects the overall value of 
the community, which perpetuates the negative reputation of the community to outsiders and 
impedes the development of pro-social identities of residents (2007). 
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The accumulated effect that stigmatization has on communities is found in the limited 
number of social networks and decreased levels of informal control. Moreover, increases in the 
removal of community residents directly decreases the number of sustainable networks. The 
additional isolation of that person’s family and/or close friends further diminishes community 
integration, or social cohesion (Clear et al. 2001; Roberts 2004; Clear 2007; Rose, Clear, and 
Ryder 2001; Rose and Clear 2002). Thus, inter-community networking is harmed by the prison 
cycling process.  
The return of large numbers of offenders to resource poor areas has severe negative 
financial consequences. As previously stated, the stigma of being a “problem” place prevents 
new business and new people from coming to these areas. In this way, incarceration reduces the 
likelihood of meaningful employment for ex-offenders, which at the community level, is related 
to the breakdown of the nuclear family (Lynch and Sabol 2004b, Western 2006). 
A community’s capacity to absorb economic downturn and residential instability depends 
on community resources, usually in the form of human and social capital (Clear 2007, Sampson 
et al. 1997). Disadvantaged communities already struggle to establish valuable human and social 
capital, and thus are unable to cope with the increased instability that results from high rates of 
coercive mobility. There are also fewer neighborhood resources to respond to the conditions of 
poverty, including food banks, soup kitchens, education and intervention programs, 
transportation, resident associations, and healthcare facilities. Therefore, high rates of 
incarceration further disadvantages poor communities by putting increased strain on social and 
economic networks that are needed to build human and social capital. Processes of collective 
efficacy are eroded, weakening a community’s ability to recognize and ameliorate social 
problems in their neighborhood.  
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Communities stuck in the process of prison cycling adopt different social norms and 
cultural expectations to cope with the changes in street norms brought on by large populations of 
ex-prisoners (Clear 2007; Sampson and Loeffler 2010; Fagan et al. 2003). In other words, once a 
sizeable proportion of the population begins to operate under a different set of norms (e.g. the 
norms associated with prison culture), it is likely that the new value system will proliferate 
throughout the community, thus shifting residents away from traditional norms. For example, in 
a study of New York neighborhoods, rates of drug arrests in neighborhoods with high rates of 
incarceration remained staggering despite declining crime rates, suggesting that the drug trade 
became a source of income and a social ecological factor for these communities (Fagan et al. 
2003). Rose and Clear refer this consequence of incarceration as heterogeneity of norms and 
values (1998). Theoretically, the idea of heterogeneity of norms and values is also consistent 
with criminological explanations as to why racial/ethnic heterogeneity contributes to community 
social disorganization (Shaw and McKay 1942/2009). The contention of norms in disorganized 
communities influences disadvantage independent of crime and incarceration by diminishing 
social cohesion.  
VII. The Effect of Incarceration on Community Disadvantage: Empirical Research 
The majority of research regarding the negative impacts of mass incarceration on 
communities predicts crime rates, or one aspect of social disorganization, such as female headed 
households using incarceration or social disadvantage measures as the primary explanatory 
variables (Clear et al. 2001; Lynch and Sabol 2004b; Kubrin and Stewart 2006). These studies 
also suggest that increases in poverty and non-nuclear families may be a product of chronic high-
rates of incarceration.  
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Sampson and Loeffler examined this relationship by conducting a time series analysis 
using incarceration as the main predictor of social disadvantage (2010). Using neighborhoods in 
Chicago as the unit of analysis, Sampson and Loeffler (2010) tested the hypothesis that the 
incarceration rate in 1995 to 2000 was a strong predictor of concentrated disadvantage 
(%poverty, %unemployed, % receiving welfare, and % single-parent female headed families) in 
2005 while controlling for changes in crime rates. They also found that “concentrated 
disadvantage strongly predicts later incarceration and that incarceration strongly predicts later 
disadvantage” (Sampson and Loeffler 2010:29). Thus, it can be inferred that the cycle of 
disadvantage and incarceration entrench communities in a “negative feed-back loop” that they 
are not equipped to escape (Sampson and Loeffler 2010:29). 
Relatedly, Clear et al. (2003) tested the hypothesis that high levels of incarceration in 
1996 predicted increases in crime in 1997 for neighborhoods in Tallahassee, Florida. They used 
two key independent variables as measures of coercive mobility: admission rates and release 
rates from prison in 1996. Not only did they find that coercive mobility was concentrated in poor 
neighborhoods located in the center of the city, but Clear and colleagues also found support for 
their hypothesis. Moreover, coercive mobility in 1996 strongly predicted crime in 1997 while 
controlling for concentrated disadvantage (%poverty, %unemployed, % black, and % single-
parent female headed families) and prior crime. They conclude that the relationship between 
ecological characteristics of communities that influence disorganization and the effects of 
disorganization are nonlinear rather than linear as proposed by social disorganization theory. 
VIII. Contributions of the Current Study 
Many of the studies on the negative consequences of incarceration, including analyses at 
the neighborhood level, focusing on neighborhoods within one state. Specifically, Clear et al.’s 
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(2003) work utilizes data on neighborhoods in one city (Tallahassee, FL). Similarly, Sampson 
and Loeffler’s work focused exclusively on Chicago neighborhoods. So it remains unclear 
whether the relationships these works identify can be generalized to the population more broadly. 
Data is limited in this regard, as it is difficult to achieve a unit of analysis small enough to 
capture community level effects, while also finding a large enough sample to be generalizable to 
the population at large. 
Sampson and Loeffler (2010) examine incarceration rates, but do not include measures of 
coercive mobility more specifically; therefore the degree to which disadvantage is due to having 
a substantial number of people incarcerated over time versus the specific causal cycling that 
Clear and colleagues (2003; 2007) propose is unclear. On the other hand, Clear and colleagues 
measure coercive mobility, but do not take into account the race-specific measures that their 
theory seems to propose (2003). Specifically, they describe the decline of African American 
neighborhoods, which suggests that coercive mobility is particularly harmful for black 
communities, but do not group admission and release rates by race. Furthermore, neither group 
of authors take into account possible mediating mechanisms through which coercive mobility 
operates to foster disadvantage, such as through the breaking down of social networks provided 
by salient community organizations. 
Some research has explored similar issues, but much of this research is at the national 
level (Greenberg and West 2001). For example, Greenberg and West discuss the importance of 
state level social characteristics such as racial make-up of the state, political arrangements (i.e. 
political conservatism), religious fundamentalism, welfare spending, poverty, and unemployment 
in predicting state variation in levels of imprisonment. Furthermore, this study employs 
longitudinal analyses to determine the influence of these predictors on state imprisonment rates. 
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The current study differs from Greenberg and West’s research in that they examine the influence 
of macro-level social measures on incarceration whereas I examine the impact of incarceration 
on county-level social measures (2001). Unlike Greenberg and West, the current study captures 
the potential county-level variations in incarceration and rates of poverty, unemployment, and 
number of religious congregations, which is necessary in order to discuss the ways in which 
coercive mobility impact communities as opposed to states. Because Greenberg and West’s 
(2001) macro-level analysis addressed state characteristics pertaining to imprisonment rates, this 
national aggregate falls short of actually getting at the community-level theories of neighborhood 
deterioration posed by Clear et al. (2003). 
The current study builds on both Sampson and Loeffler’s and Clear et al.’s work by 
analyzing the impacts of concentrated incarceration, disadvantage, and crime in 2000 on change 
in concentrated disadvantage in 2010 (2010; 2003). Previous research on this topic is limited to 
communities in one state, and does not include differences in coercive mobility and concentrated 
disadvantage by racial group. Moreover, previous research does not examine the potential 
mediating and moderating effects of important community sources of social capital such as 
religious congregations. The current study addresses these gaps in the literature by including 
multiple counties from several states, using race specific measures of coercive mobility and 
concentrated disadvantage, and including a measure of the number of religious congregations to 
determine the extent to which coercive mobility deteriorates community resources resulting in 
increased levels of disadvantage. 
IX. DATA & METHODS 
A. Sources of Data 
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The current study relies on four data sources. The dependent variable, concentrated 
disadvantage, included several key variables calculated using data from U.S. Census 2000 and 
2010. I used the Bureau of Justice Statistics National Corrections Reporting Program (NCRP) 
data to construct the primary independent variable, coercive mobility. I also utilized the 
Religious Congregations and Membership Study (RCMS) data to create a measure of community 
social capital, total congregations. Lastly, I used Uniform Crime Report (UCR) race specific 
arrest statistics to calculate a total violent crime arrest rate for each racial group in the analysis. 
The NCRP provides data for 2000 and 2010 on the prison populations of up to 38 states 
(National Archive of Criminal Justice Data, ICPSR 34984). The data provides demographic and 
legal characteristics of those admitted to prison, including the county of sentencing, as well as 
information regarding the type of release from prison, and release from parole. In order to 
capture the most accurate number of individuals admitted to state prison, I limited the total 
admissions to new court commitments, parole revocations, probation revocations, and ‘other’ 
(e.g. escape returns). I excluded cases transferred from other jurisdictions, cases sentenced to less 
than one year and individuals under age 18.  
Total prison release includes all offenders released conditionally or unconditionally from 
a state correctional facility, excluding those who were transferred to different facilities and those 
who died while imprisoned. I also excluded a small number of cases admitted in state courts but 
held in federal custody because county FIPS codes were not available.  
Although much of the theoretical literature reviewed above discuss the consequences of 
incarceration at the neighborhood level, research in this area as well as research on community 
characteristics and crime rates uses larger units of analysis, such as metropolitan areas or 
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counties (Sabol and Lynch 2003; Sampson 2013). Micro-level effects of the cycle of 
incarceration over time are likely to be evident at the county level as well. Using counties also 
has a number of advantages. Counties provide a large enough sample size to adequately assess 
the proposed hypotheses while providing results that may generalize to the population at large. 
The county-level is also the lowest level of aggregation for which necessary data are available 
nationwide. 
In order to facilitate race-specific comparisons, I restricted the Census data for both 
points in time to include counties with a minimum population of 10,000 with at least 2,000 
African American residents. After these changes were made, 1,078 counties met the criteria. The 
number of counties used in the analysis was then restricted by the availability of the NCRP data. 
Of the 1,078 counties available in the Census that met the population criteria, 899 counties, or 83 
percent of the counties available in the Census are represented in the NCRP. The NCRP data was 
limited to counties that reported in 2000 and 2010. After matching the limited NCRP data to the 
Census data limited by population criteria, 779 or 42 percent of the sample counties in the NCRP 
are represented in the Census. The data was then matched with the other 2 data sources (UCR 
arrest and RCMS) resulting in a sample size of 702 counties. Finally, the sample of counties was 
screened for extreme cases by plotting the residuals, which led the removal of one case resulting 
in a final sample size of 701 counties. Representing 24 states, this final dataset provides a variety 
of regional and county contexts.  
B. Dependent Variables 
The dependent variable for the current study, concentrated disadvantage, is a 
combination of characteristics of ecological disadvantage that prior research has determined to 
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be highly correlated, and often times operate together to produce criminogenic places. Previous 
studies of the effects of incarceration on crime and disadvantage have measured concentrated 
disadvantage as a factor that combines poverty rate, unemployment rate, the percent of 
households that are female-headed, and the percent of the population receiving public assistance 
(Sampson and Loeffler 2010; Clear et al. 2001). The current study uses these same indicators. 
The dependent variables used in the current study were calculated using social, 
demographic, and economic information from the U.S. Census for each county in 2000 and 
2010. Poverty was measured as the percent of the population, and female headship was measured 
as the percent of households with related children under the care of a single-parent female. 
Unemployment was measured as the percent of the population unemployed but seeking work in 
the labor market, and public assistance was measured as the percent of the population that 
receives public assistance per county.  
To be consistent with the limited amount of empirical work done on this concept, I 
created the same measure of concentrated disadvantage (%poverty, %unemployed, %female-
headship, and %public assistance). The dependent measures were constructed to be race-specific 
to isolate the relationship proposed by Clear and colleagues (2003). This results in two 
dependent variables including a measure of black concentrated disadvantage and a measure of 
nonblack concentrated disadvantage.  
Principle component factor analysis standardizes the combined measures to create a mean 
of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. This technique makes calculating change scores (CD in 2010 
– CD in 2000) problematic due to the lack of variability produced by the factor. Therefore, the 
current study utilized a different operationalization of concentrated disadvantage to be used in 
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change analyses. A measure of total concentrated disadvantage was created by summing the 
four measures used in the factor (%poverty, %unemployed, %female-headship, and %public 
assistance) for each racial group. Calculating a total percentage sum of disadvantage for both 
points in time and using these measures to calculate a change score allows for significant 
variation in the dependent variable across counties. Total disadvantage in 2000 was then 
subtracted from total disadvantage in 2010 to create a measure of change in concentrated 
disadvantage. This operationalization of change in concentrated disadvantage results in two 
dependent variables: black change in concentrated disadvantage and nonblack change in 
concentrated disadvantage. 
C. Key Independent Variables  
 The primary explanatory variable in the current study is coercive mobility. Two measures 
from the NCRP were used to operationalize this concept: the total number of individuals 
admitted and released from state prisons, by county of admission, in 2000 and 2010. The sum of 
these two measures equals total prison movements. I calculated race-specific (black, non-black) 
rates of prison movement by dividing the total number of the population and multiplying by 
10,000. Thus, coercive mobility1 is a measure of the rate of total prison movements per 10,000 in 
the population. 
This operationalization is consistent with Clear et al. (2001) measure of coercive 
mobility, in that they also relied on admission rates and release rates. I ran analyses using both 
the admissions and release rates in the same model, as Clear et al. (2003) do in their analysis. 
However, supplemental analyses revealed high correlation between the two measures and, 
1 Supplemental analyses revealed issues of multicollinearity between measures of percent urban and interaction 
terms, thus measures of percent urban were centered on their means to correct for this. 
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subsequently, little difference between findings across operationalization strategy. A measure of 
the total prison movements rate provides more variation and a larger change in totals over time, 
thus this operationalization of coercive mobility is the most fitting for the current study.  
Clear (2007) notes that the level of religiosity of communities may also dampen some of 
the damaging effects of incarceration. On the other hand, the deleterious effects of coercive 
mobility on community organization may suggest the breakdown of social networks necessary 
for creating social capital.  Therefore, although religion is not the primary focus of this paper, 
this paper utilizes measures of community religious institutions to examine these possibilities. 
To examine the social networking capacities of religious institutions, the current study 
relies on data from the Religious Congregations & Membership Study (RCMS). The information 
collected for 2000 and 2010 was sponsored by the Association of Statisticians of American 
Religious Bodies (Jones et al. 2002). The RCMS provides county-by-county listing of religious 
bodies in the United States for over 140 religious denominations. Participating religious bodies 
provide information on the numbers of churches, full members, and adherents (i.e. regular 
participants and church members who are not considered full members).  
I include the rate of the number of congregations to examine potential mediating and 
moderating effects of sources of social networks (i.e. religious intuitions) on the impact of 
incarceration and concentrated disadvantage.  The rate of congregations refers to the total 
number of churches, temples, mosques, or any other publicly specified group meeting place 
where people meet to practice their faith per 10,000 county residents. 
Although previous research that assessed the relationship between crime and religion in 
communities often relies on a measure of religious adherence rates, the current study utilizes the 
rate of religious congregations for two reasons: 1) the focus of the current study is on 
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concentrated disadvantage, not crime. Disadvantage, as operationalized in the current study, is an 
assessment of institutional failure on the part of the community. Disadvantaged communities 
lack resources provided by social institutions to combat the deleterious effects of disadvantage. 
Thus, the present study is interested in the impact that religious institutions, or congregations, 
has on county-level disadvantage. 2) Adherence rate is a measure of individuals in the 
surrounding area that regularly attend religious services per 10,000 in the population at the 
county-level. The adherence rate largely misses the impact that the presence of the religious 
institution may have on the community as a whole. As Clear (2007) notes, communities affected 
by coercive mobility may be characterized by large homeless populations and high rates 
joblessness. Churches are known for servicing the community by providing shelter and other 
necessities to those in need, thus the number of congregations may better capture the service-
oriented capabilities of religious institutions. 
D. Control Variables 
Prior research and criminological theory has identified key macrostructural 
characteristics as important covariates of crime rates (Shaw and McKay 1942/2009; Sabol and 
Lynch 2003; Clear et al. 2001. I control for residential mobility (i.e., the percent of individuals 
that moved houses within the past 5 years); racial/ethnic heterogeneity calculated as the percent 
of the population that is black; male crime-prone population (i.e. proportion of the population 
that is male and between the ages of 15 and 29); educational attainment (i.e. calculated as the 
percent of the population without a high school diploma or equivalent). These measures were 
constructed using Census data for 2000 and 2010.  
Similar to prior research, I created a black violence rate and a nonblack violence rate 
using the Uniform Crime Report race-specific arrest data (Clear et al. 2001; Sampson and 
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Loeffler 2010). The violence rates were created by summing the total number of arrests for 
homicides, forcible rapes, robberies, and aggravated assaults. To insure stability in the data, I 
summed arrest counts per offense for 1999, 2000, and 2001 and 2009, 2010, and 2011. The arrest 
counts were aggregated to the county level for all six points in time. The three-year arrest figures 
were then averaged to create violence indices. The three-year averages were then divided by the 
race-specific population and multiplied by 10,000 to create a rate. 
Clear’s (2007) theoretical framework outlines the detrimental impact that coercive 
mobility has on communities over time. The communities he refers to are primarily 
disadvantaged, minority communities that exist in urban places. Thus, the current study also 
utilizes a measure of percent urban2 to control for the degree of urbanity within counties. The 
inclusion of this measure will also help to determine whether the relationship between coercive 
mobility and concentrated disadvantage is only an urban phenomenon, or if it is something that 
occurs in the population more broadly. To further examine this point, the present study also tests 
an interaction effect of percent urban and coercive mobility, percent urban x black/nonblack 
coercive mobility. 
E. Proposed Analytical Strategy 
Because I am interested in predicting the degree of change over time in concentrated 
disadvantage (dependent variable) that is associated with the level of coercive mobility, I will be 
conducting longitudinal multivariate regression analyses. All multivariate models of change will 
include 2000 estimates of disadvantage as covariates. Otherwise, it is unclear whether the 
relationships between the independent variables are a result of the association to change over 
time, or if the relationship is a result of the association between the independent variables and the 
2 Supplemental analyses revealed issues of multicollinearity between measures of percent urban and interaction 
terms, thus measures of percent urban were centered on their means to correct for this. 
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earlier disadvantage. Controlling for concentrated disadvantage at 2000 accounts for this, 
capturing the net effects of the change in concentrated disadvantage and the independent 
variables. 
There are a number of ways in which regression analyses can capture the correlates of 
change. After I regress each of my 2010 disadvantage outcomes on coercive mobility to establish 
the baseline association between these measures, I run a series of models applying two 
approaches: 1) regressing Concentrated Disadvantage (CD) at 2010 (Time 2) on predictors 
measured at 2010, while including 2000 CD (Time 1) as a covariate; and 2) using change scores 
as the dependent variable (Time 2 CD -Time 1 CD), regressed on predictors at Time 2 (or 
changes in predictors, to be determined based upon preliminary analyses), while including Time 
1 CD as a covariate (Dalecki and Willits 1991). Both techniques provide virtually identical 
interpretations of the substantive relationships (Dalecki and Willits 1991; Allison 1990). While 
the former is the more common technique in studies of community-level change and is consistent 
with Sampson and Loeffler’s and Drakulich et al.’s analysis, scholars have argued that the latter 
deals more directly with adjusted change and controls for possible time-stable confounders 
(2010; 2012; Dalecki and Willets 1991). Greenberg and West employed both approaches (2001). 
F. Hypotheses  
Based upon the theoretical concepts and literature previously discussed, I put forth the 
following hypotheses:  
H1: Changes in concentrated disadvantage will be related to changes in coercive 
mobility, positively, controlling for rates of concentrated disadvantage at Time 1 and other 
measures (crime, residential mobility, etc.) at Time 2. Counties in which levels of coercive 
mobility increased will become increasingly disadvantaged over time.  
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H2: The number of congregations will mediate the effect of coercive mobility on 
concentrated disadvantage. High levels of coercive mobility will operate through the number of 
congregations to increase levels of disadvantage by depleting the networking capabilities found 
in religious organizations. This may result in fewer congregations in counties with high levels of 
coercive mobility relative to other counties.  
H3: The number of congregations will moderate the relationship between coercive 
mobility and concentrated disadvantage. The magnitude of the effect of coercive mobility on 
concentrated disadvantage will be smaller in areas where the number of religious congregations 
is high.  
Communities with a substantial number of religious congregations provide more of the 
social capital necessary to mitigate the negative impact of coercive mobility. These communities 
will experience less economic and social decline than comparable communities that lack 
religious resources. 
H4: The degree of urbanity within counties will moderate the relationship between 
coercive mobility and concentrated disadvantage. The effect of coercive mobility on 
concentrated disadvantage will be stronger in counties that have more urban populations 
compared to other counties.  
X. RESULTS 
 
 First, I summarize the descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations. Second, I discuss 
the results for cross-sectional models predicting CD in 2000 and CD in 2010. Third, I present the 
findings for the regressor variable models, in which concentrated disadvantage in 2010 is 
regressed on controls and concentrated disadvantage in 2000. Finally, summarize the results for 
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the models that predict changes in concentrated disadvantage, identified as the change score 
method. 
 Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for variables used in the analyses for the present 
study. Variables are shown as percentages or per capita rates in order to be easily interpreted. 
Results for log transformations are also shown. At both points in time, the average total 
concentrated disadvantage (CD) for blacks was more than double that of nonblacks. Both groups 
experienced growth in concentrated disadvantage over time; the average level of CD increased 
over 20 percent for blacks from 2000 to 2010, while CD increased at just under 7 percent for 
nonblacks.  
 There are also racial differences in the coercive mobility and arrest measures over time. 
In 2000, African Americans were admitted to and released from prison at a rate of 134 per 
10,000, which was approximately 6 times greater than the nonblack rate of 20 admissions and 
releases per 10,000. In 2010, there was a slight decrease in the coercive mobility rate from 134 to 
132 per 10,000 for African Americans resulting in a negative change score. The nonblack 
coercive mobility rate increased in 2010 to 26 prison movements per 10,000. In 2000, blacks 
were arrested at rates more than 5 times greater than nonblacks for violent offenses. The rate of 
arrest for violent offenses increased for both groups in 2010. More specifically, African 
American violent arrests increased from nearly 33 to 43 per 10,000 and nonblack violent arrests 
increased from 6 to 9 per 10,000.  
The level of residential mobility, or the percent of the population that moved to a new 
county during the preceding 5 years (1995 – 2000 or 2005 – 2010), decreased by more than half 
for both racial groups. The level of residential mobility was comparable across racial categories. 
In 2000, 20 percent of the black population moved to new counties while 18 percent of the 
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nonblack population moved. In 2010, these numbers decreased to 9 percent and 7 percent, 
respectively, resulting in negative change values. In 2000, the percentage of the black population 
with less than a high school degree or equivalent was more than double the value for the 
nonblack population. By 2010, both groups experienced a decrease, but the difference between 
the groups was still substantial. For African Americans, the percent of the population over the 
age of 25 with less than a high school education decreased from over 33 percent in 2000 to less 
than 24 percent in 2010. The results for the nonblack population indicate a decrease from 16 
percent in 2000 to 8 percent in 2010. Both of these differences result in a negative change score, 
suggesting that levels of education improved for both racial groups over time.  
From 2000 to 2010, the nonblack male population aged 15 to 29 decreased from 12 
percent to 9 percent of the population. Over the same time period, the black male population 
aged 16 to 29 increased from 8 percent to 12 percent.  
Three measures in the models are not race-specific: the percent urban, the congregation 
rate, and percent black. The percent living in urban places increased slightly from 56 percent in 
2000 to nearly 58 percent in 2010. There was an average increase of approximately 3 
congregations per 10,000 persons over the ten year period. On average, the rate of congregations 
was 15 per 10,000 county residents in 2000. In 2010, the average number of congregations 
increased to roughly 18 per 10,000 county residents. The percent of the population that was 
African American increased slightly from 2000 to 2010. 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
Tables 2a and 2b display the results for the bivariate correlations of all variables in the 
models. Table 2a shows that the concentrated disadvantage factor is highly correlated with the 
total sum of concentrated disadvantage as one would expect since the former is comprised of the 
33 
 
later (r= .964). Both of these dependent variables show weak to moderate correlations with the 
independent variables that correspond to the same year. The two measures of concentrated 
disadvantage for both years reveal moderate to strong positive correlations with black low 
educational attainment (r< .500). Measures of residential mobility are negatively correlated with 
both measures of CD. 
Concentrated disadvantage in 2000 is strongly correlated with concentrated disadvantage 
in 2010 (r= .789). Concentrated disadvantage had a positive, weak to moderate correlation with 
coercive mobility during both time periods. These findings indicate that the relationship between 
coercive mobility and disadvantage are also relatively stable over time.  
 Table 2b shows the bivariate correlations for the nonblack model. Findings are similar to 
those in the black model. Concentrated disadvantage is strongly correlated between years (r= 
.964 and r= .957) and is positively correlated with the violent arrest rate at both points in time. 
Similar to correlations among the black sample, there are negative correlations in the nonblack 
sample between both measures of CD in 2000 and 2010 and residential mobility at both points in 
time.     
 [INSERT TABLES 2A & 2B HERE] 
Overall, the findings in table 2a and 2b indicate that most measures are stable over a 10 
year period. Results reveal expected relationships between the dependent and independent 
variables. There are noteworthy differences between racial groups, particularly with regard to 
concentrated disadvantage and coercive mobility. At first glance, these findings suggest that 
coercive mobility is more strongly associated with concentrated disadvantage for nonblacks than 
blacks. One possibility is that already high levels of disadvantage among African American 
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communities limits the capacity for further destabilizing effects, such that the deleterious effects 
of coercive mobility are more likely to be detected in nonblack models. 
I estimated several models assessing the relationship between concentrated disadvantage 
and coercive mobility. Cross-sectional analyses conducted to establish a baseline for the change 
models are shown in Tables 3a and 3b. Table 3a shows that models explain between 37 and 40 
percent of the variance in black concentrated disadvantage in 2000. Consistent with Clear’s 
(2007) argument, counties with higher rates of black coercive mobility have significantly higher 
rates of black concentrated disadvantage net of controls. As expected, counties with higher 
violent arrest rates, poorer educational attainment, higher percentages of young males, larger 
black populations, and/or more urban populations have higher levels of concentrated 
disadvantage. Lower levels of residential mobility were positively associated with black CD. 
These effects remained consistent across models. 
Model 2 included a measure of the rate of religious congregations per 10,000 in a county. 
Congregation rate is positive and significant, suggesting that counties that had higher levels of 
black CD also had higher rates of religious congregations. Both black CM and the rate of 
congregations had independent positive effects on black CD in 2000. However, the effect of CM 
grew stronger once the main and interaction effects of congregation rates were included in the 
model, suggesting a possible suppression effect. Although areas with higher rates of CM tend to 
have higher congregation rates, some of the effect of CM on CD is mitigated by those 
institutions. In other words, there is a moderation effect, in that the effect of black CM is weaker 
in places with higher congregation rates. This suggests the strong positive effect of CM on CD is 
being lessened by the presence of religious institutions in communities.   
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 [INSERT TABLE 3A & 3B HERE] 
Model 4 incorporated an interaction between percent urban and CM. Results indicate that 
effect of CM on CD is conditional on counties’ level of urbanity. In other words, the detrimental 
effect of CM on communities is significantly stronger in urban areas.  
Model 5 in Table 3b provides the regression estimates of disadvantage on coercive 
mobility among nonblacks in 2000. Across models, r-squares indicate that approximately 39 to 
41 percent of the variance in concentrated disadvantage is explained. 
In many ways, the nonblack models are comparable to findings in the black models. 
Specifically, models show that counties with higher rates of nonblack coercive mobility had 
significantly higher rates of nonblack concentrated disadvantage net of controls. Counties that 
are more urban, have higher violent arrest rates, have lower educational attainment, and/or have 
more males age 15 to 29 had higher levels of concentrated disadvantage. Interestingly, counties 
with higher levels of residential mobility and larger black populations had lower levels of 
nonblack concentrated disadvantage.  
A comparison across models shows that the main effect of CM remained positive and 
significant after incorporating the main and interaction effects of congregation rates and percent 
urban. Models 6 through 8 show that, unlike the black models, the main effect of congregation 
rate was not a significant predictor of CM. It did, however, have a moderating effect. 
Similar to black models, Model 7 shows that the joint effect of congregations and 
nonblack CM was significant, indicating that the rate of congregations lessened the negative 
impacts of CM on nonblack CD in 2000. In addition, Model 8 tested the percent urban as a 
moderator between nonblack CM and nonblack CD, and found evidence of a moderating 
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relationship. The findings were positive and significant; the effect of nonblack CM is stronger in 
counties that have larger urban populations. 
Table 3b provides the regression estimates for the effects of CM on CD in 2010 for 
blacks and nonblacks. Models accounts for 36 to 44 percent of the variance in levels of black CD 
in 2010. Similar to the results found in the previous models, counties with higher rates of black 
CM correspond to higher rates of black CD. The majority of the relationships that existed in 
2000 remained significant in 2010. However, percent urban did reach statistical significance in 
model 1. 
The inclusion of the rate of religious congregations in models 2 indicate that black CM 
and the number of congregations both had direct effects on black CD, but there was no mediating 
effect of congregations on black CD. The inclusion of the rate of religious congregations did 
change the effect of percent urban; it became statistically significant in model 2.  
The number of congregations moderated the effect of black CM on CD (shown in model 
3) such that the effect of black CM is significantly weaker in counties with more religious 
congregations. Model 4 includes the interaction of percent urban and black CM, revealing a 
significant moderating relationship in that the effects of black CM are stronger in urban areas. 
All of the relationships found in models 1 and 2 remained consistent in models 3 and 4 with the 
exception of black residential mobility. 
Models 5 through 8 in table 3b display the regression estimates for the nonblack 
population for 2010. The majority of the relationships found in 2000 were also found in 2010. 
Percent black, however, was positively associated with nonblack CD in 2010; it corresponded to 
lower levels of nonblack CD in 2000. The inclusion of the rate of congregations in model 6 did 
not alter the effects of the other independent variables on nonblack CD in 2010. The rate of 
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congregations did directly impact nonblack CD, indicating that counties with higher levels of 
nonblack CD corresponded to higher rates of religious congregations.  
Similar to the results found in Table 3a, Model 7 shows that the congregation rate 
significantly moderated the impact of nonblack CM on nonblack CD. Furthermore, the effect of 
nonblack CM on nonblack CD was significantly weaker in counties with higher religious 
congregation rates. The inclusion of the interaction term for percent urban and nonblack CM in 
model 8 shows there is a significant moderating relationship between nonblack CM and percent 
urban. Comparable to black models, the effects of nonblack CM were stronger in more urban 
counties. 
Table 4 presents results from a set of models regressing CD in 2010 on the same set of 
independent variables and a measure of CD in 2000 as a covariate. According to Dalecki and 
Willets (1991) and Allison (1990), this is one technique that assesses change in the dependent 
variable while controlling for time-stable confounders. Table 4 displays the results from this 
approach.  
The explained variance ranged from 62 to 64 percent across black models. The results in 
Models 1 through 4 indicate that black violent arrests and low levels of education were 
significant predictors of CD. Not surprisingly, disadvantage counties in 2000 were also more 
likely to have high levels of disadvantage in 2010. Black coercive mobility did not have a main 
effect on CD across models. Much of the current disadvantage among African Americans can be 
attributed to past disadvantage. As main effects, factors that theoretically should be positively 
associated with disadvantage, particularly coercive mobility, did not have a significant effect on 
disadvantage net of CD in 2000.   
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Model 2 includes the main effect of congregation rate, while Model 3 includes the 
interaction effect to test for its potential moderating effects of CM on CD. Results suggest that 
congregations had a direct positive effect on black CD; counties with high levels of black CD 
were associated with high rates of religious congregations. The effect of black CM was not 
moderated by congregation rates.  
Model 4 includes the interaction term to test for a moderating effect of percent urban on 
the relationship between black CM and CD. The main effect is still nonsignificant, which along 
with the positive interaction, suggests that the detrimental effect of black CM on black CD is 
primarily experienced within concentrated areas-i.e., more urban counties. The significant 
positive effect indicates that the degree to which CM impacts counties’ CD is dependent on their 
level of urbanity.  
Comparable models for the nonblack population are in Models 5 through 8. Models 
accounted for 57 to 58 percent of the variance in nonblack CD. Similar to the black models, high 
levels of nonblack violent arrests, low levels of education, larger African American populations, 
the percent of the population that resides in urban places, and nonblack CD in 2000 were 
associated with high levels of nonblack CD in 2010. High levels of nonblack residential mobility 
rate corresponded to low levels of nonblack CD. Unlike in the black models, the models 
generally indicated a significant main effect of coercive mobility on nonblack CD, net of other 
variables. In particular, counties with higher levels of CM in 2010 were associated with increases 
in CD in 2010, net of levels of nonblack CD in 2000.  
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
39 
 
 Models 5 and 6 explored the possibility of a mediating effect, in that CM could have an 
indirect effect on CD through its impact of the effectiveness of religious congregations. There 
was little evidence of a mediation effect. Both CM and the congregation rate had significant 
main effects on CD, and the magnitude of the CM effect only decreased slightly once 
congregations were incorporated into the model. Overall, in comparing Models 5 and 6, findings 
suggest that much of the effect of nonblack CM is independent of the rate of religious 
congregations. Model 7 assessed whether the relationship between nonblack CM and nonblack 
CD was moderated by congregation rate, and found no significant interaction. Model 8 examined 
a second potential moderating relationship between nonblack CM and percent urban on nonblack 
CD, and again found no evidence to support this relationship. 
 Overall, the results suggested that, controlling for other factors, high rates of CM were 
directly associated with high levels of CD for nonblacks. The main effects were not significant 
for blacks. However, the effects of coercive mobility for African Americans are conditional on a 
county’s percent of urban residents. The rate of congregations had a positive direct effect on CD 
for both racial groups, indicating that both disadvantaged black communities and disadvantaged 
nonblack communities tend to have more congregations per capita than counties with low rates 
of disadvantage. 
 For my final analyses, I ran models utilizing change score techniques. I estimated a set of 
models in which the dependent variable was the change in the total summed percent of 
concentrated disadvantage (Y2 – Y1). There are multiple ways to utilize change scores as the 
dependent variable in regression analyses, so I explored a variety of strategies in this regard 
(Allison 1990; Dalecki and Willits 1991). The independent variables were the same as those in 
the previous time regressor analyses, with the exception of the coercive mobility measure. 
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Coercive mobility was calculated as a change score (X2 – X1) so that change in the dependent 
variable was regressed on change in the primary independent variable controlling for time-stable 
confounders. Unfortunately, none of these additional models yielded particualry meaningful 
findings. Consequently, I will summarize selected models briefly and provide some of these 
results in Appendix A (complete results for single change score models will be provided upon 
request). 
Initial models regressing change in black CD on black CM revealed there was not a 
significant relationship between these variables. Violent arrest rate and educational attainment 
was significantly related to black CD. Counties with high levels of black CD in 2000 tend to 
decrease in levels of black CD over time. This negative relationship is likely due to the tendency 
of Y1 measures to regress towards the mean (Allison 1990). As stated by Paul Allison, 
“individuals with high pretest scores will tend to move down on the posttest, while measures 
with low pretest scores will tend to move up” (1990: 95).  
The inclusion of the rate of congregations indicated a significant direct effect on change 
in black CD. Counties that increased in black CD had also increased in rate of religious 
congregations. Model 3 assessed whether the relationship between change in black CM and 
change in black CD was moderated by congregation rate, and found no significant interaction. 
Model 4 tested a potential moderating relationship between change in black CM and percent 
urban on black CD, and found a marginally significant positive effect (p< .10). Introducing the 
interaction of percent urban and black CM into the model slightly altered the main effect of black 
CM on CD such that the effect of black CM on black CD was negative and marginally 
significant (p< .10). These findings indicated that black CD increased in urban counties with 
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high rates of black CM, while the negative main effect of black CM on CD suggests that black 
CM may be associated with a decrease in CD in rural counties.  
Supplemental analysis also found that changes in nonblack CM were not significantly 
associated with CD in any of the models. Violent crime arrest rate, educational attainment, 
percent urban, and percent nonblack male aged 15-29, and increases in the percent of African 
American population were all associated with increases in nonblack CD over time. Similar to the 
black models, nonblack CD in 2000 was negatively associated with change in nonblack CD. This 
finding suggested that counties with high levels of nonblack CD in 2000 tended to decrease in 
nonblack CD over time, or counties with low levels of CD in 2000 increased in levels of CD 
faster over time. This finding is consistent across all four models. The inclusion of the number of 
congregations was positive and significant. Models including each of the interaction terms 
showed they did not reach statistical significance.  
In addition to these models, I conducted several supplemental analyses to examine 
change in multiple ways, and address the considerable disagreement among scholars regarding 
the appropriateness of particular change score modeling strategies (Allison 1990). First, I 
removed the measure of concentrated disadvantage at T1. Allison suggests that doing so 
differentiates the change score model from the regressor variable approach (used in my initial 
models in Table 4). Otherwise, inclusion of the initial CD measure would make the two models 
computationally equivalent. Nevertheless, I found no difference across models in the 
relationships of interest.  
Second, I regressed change in CD on change in each predictor variable while controlling 
CD at T1. Change in CM was not significant in any model for either blacks or nonblacks. 
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Concentrated disadvantage in 2000 was not significant in any of the black models, but was 
significant and negative in the nonblack models. The main and interaction effects of 
congregation rate were not significantly related to change in CD for blacks or nonblacks. The 
interaction of change in percent urban and change in black CM was significant for black CD. 
This finding suggested that the effects of black CM on black CD were lessened in counties where 
urban populations grew.  
In sum, utilizing change score techniques did not meaningfully improve the analyses or 
provide additional information beyond that delivered in the time regressor models. These results 
are not surprising, given the notable unreliability of change scores, especially in situations where 
Time 1 and Time 2 measures are highly correlated (Allison 1990). Results for both supplemental 
change analyses are available upon request. 
I also conducted additional analyses to confirm the robustness of the findings. First, one 
feature of highly disadvantaged places is higher rates of crime. Most studies that assess crime 
and disadvantage are either predicting violent crime, or control for violent crime. In addition to a 
measure of violence, Sampson and Loeffler included a measure of drug related offenses in their 
analyses. Their reason for doing so was that they wanted to have a measure of the rate of crime 
that included “those forms that tend to generate the most public attention and that have been 
implicated in the imprisonment run-up” (2010: 25). Sampson and Loeffler created a factor of 
“crime propensity” using principal components analysis that included violence (assault, rape, and 
homicide), drug-related offenses, robbery, and burglary rates. As a proxy of this strategy, I 
conducted several models that included the race-specific drug arrest rate as an independent 
variable. The first set of models regressed 2010 CD on 2010 CM while including 2000 CD as a 
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covariate, and I replaced the measure of violent arrest rates with drug arrest rates. The second set 
of models examined the same relationships, but included the violent arrest rates in the same 
model with a measure of drug arrests. These results are found in Appendix B.  
The findings indicated that the drug arrest rate does not significantly predict increases in 
CD for either group. Furthermore, when the violent arrest rate was included in the models the 
drug arrest rate became significant and negative. The effect of coercive mobility did not 
experience much substantive change with the inclusion of the drug measure. Increases in black 
CM were associated with increases in black CD in model 1. However, including the violent 
arrest rate in model 2 reduced the effect of this relationship to non-significance. This finding 
suggested that the black violence measure had a stronger relationship with the black CD than 
black CM or the black drug arrest rate. 
 Similar results are found in the nonblack models. Nonblack coercive mobility is 
significant in both models, while the drug arrest rate was only significant with the inclusion of 
the nonblack violence measure. This finding indicated that the relationship between nonblack 
CD and the nonblack drug arrest rate is likely spurious, and substantively insignificant. In sum, 
the inclusion of the drug arrest rate did not alter the effects of coercive mobility on concentrated 
disadvantage found in previous models. 
 Second, I examined whether religious adherence rates mediated or moderated the 
relationship between CM and CD. Research on the relationship between crime and religion 
primarily uses a measure of religious adherence to capture the degree of religious social capital 
that may provide buffers against criminogenic conditions (e.g. concentrated disadvantage) within 
counties (Beyerlein and Hipp 2005; Lee and Bartkowsi, 2004). Total religious adherence was 
calculated as the proportion of the county’s total population that adheres to a religious institution, 
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or the rate of adherence per 10,000 persons. The current paper uses the number of congregations 
as a measure of the amount of capital and structural presence provided by religious institutions. 
However, it was possible that the rate adherence would produce similar results given the 
theoretical relevance of this measure.  
To examine this possibility, I repeated the analyses where CD in 2010 was regressed on 
predictors in 2010 while using CD in 2000 as a covariate. The results are displayed in Appendix 
C. In models 1 through 3, the relationship between black CM and black CD did not change with 
the inclusion of adherence rates, or the interaction term. In other words, adherence rates did not 
have a direct or indirect effect on black CD, nor did this measure alter the effect of black CM on 
black CD. In models 4 through 6, the inclusion of adherence rates did not change the relationship 
between nonblack CM and nonblack CD, but adherence rates did have a direct effect on 
nonblack CM such that counties that experienced increases in rates of adherence had decreases in 
nonblack CD. Furthermore, the effect of nonblack CM on nonblack CD became slightly stronger 
with the inclusion of the adherence rate, suggesting a suppression effect from model 4 to model 
5. Nonblack coercive mobility has a significant effect on nonblack concentrated disadvantage, as 
seen in model 4, but religious adherence slightly counters that effect, as shown in model 5. The 
interaction term in model 6 did not reach statistical significance. In brief, using adherence rates 
in the place of the number of congregations did not change the relationships of interest. 
 Finally, I also tested the possibility that adherence to black Protestant religious 
congregations3, rather than overall adherence rates, may moderate the relationship between CM 
and CD, particularly when measuring black CD. The RCMS data that included a measure of 
black Protestant adherence was only available in 2010, otherwise it would likely have been 
3 I thank the members of my committee for bringing this possibility to my attention. 
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included in all analyses. Including black Protestant adherence rates decreased the sample size to 
659 counties. Historically, the black church provided more than spiritual guidance. These 
institutions united the black public, and provided welfare as well as political leadership for 
African American communities. Adherence rates to black religious congregations may be a 
better measure of social capital and networking for African American communities. Thus, it is 
possible that adherence to black Protestant congregations may moderate the impact of CM on 
CD such that high rates of black Protestant adherence may weaken the effect of CM on CD.  
To examine this possibility, I repeated the same analyses used to test the effect of overall 
adherence rates. The inclusion of the interaction term (black Protestant adherence x 
black/nonblack coercive mobility) did not reach statistical significance for blacks or nonblacks. 
Moreover, black Protestant adherence did not moderate the relationship between CM and CD for 




 The goal of the current study was to investigate the relationship between coercive 
mobility and disadvantage over time. In particular, I explored race-specific effects of 
congregation rate and percent urban on the relationship between coercive mobility and 
disadvantage. Analyses revealed that coercive mobility was positively and significantly related to 
concentrated disadvantage both cross-sectionally and over time. The results suggest that while 
high rates of incarceration do have deleterious macro-level effects, both among nonblack and 




Generally, among the cross-sectional models, rates of violent arrest, educational 
attainment, percent black, percent young males, and percent urban were associated with 
concentrated disadvantage for blacks and nonblacks.  These findings are consistent with social 
disorganization theory as well as the later conceptualizations of this theory (Shaw and McKay 
1942/2009; Bursik and Grasmick 1993; Sampson and Wilson 199; Sampson et al. 1997). 
Findings corroborate the work of Clear and colleagues, and are consistent with Sampson 
and Loeffler’s findings (2007; Rose and Clear 2001; Clear et al. 2003; 2010). Although Clear 
and colleagues were predicting crime rates as opposed to levels of disadvantage, their central 
thesis was that coercive mobility, or the prison cycling process, was detrimental to communities 
in multiple ways. The forced removal and reentry of relatively large segments of the community 
population interrupted family ties and informal and formal networks, which, in turn, interrupted 
social cohesion and unanimity needed for communities to foster effective community-level 
control. This lack of cohesion and control is conducive to crime, which is conducive to increased 
levels of disadvantage. 
The current study tested four predictions. The first was that changes in coercive mobility 
would be positively related to changes in CD. Next, the study explored the possibility of 
mediating and moderating effects of the rate of religious congregations. Moreover, CM may 
operate through religious congregations to increase CD by depleting resources provided by 
churches, or religious congregations may provide the social capital necessary to combat the 
deleterious effects of CM on CD. Finally, the present analysis examined the possibility that the 
effect of CM on CD may be stronger in urban counties by including an interaction term. 
My findings provide partial support for Hypothesis 1 and are consistent with the 
theoretical argument presented by Clear and other scholars (Clear 2007; Rose and Clear 2001; 
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Clear et al. 2003; Sampson and Loeffler 2010). The fact that the effects of CM on CD are 
consistent over a 10 year time period indicates the stability of this relationship. Furthermore, this 
relationship was found for both blacks and nonblacks at the county-level. Time regressor models 
that control for prior disadvantage, however, indicated that the effect of CM was entirely 
conditional on percent urban and congregation rate among blacks. The nonsignificant main effect 
is not surprising, in that the main effect would reflect the effect of CM in a county with no urban 
population (an unlikely circumstance). 
Contrary to theoretical expectations, high levels of residential mobility were associated 
with low levels of concentrated disadvantage for both racial groups. Finding that coercive 
mobility (the forced removal and reentry of residents) corresponded to high levels of CD, while 
residential mobility (the voluntary movement of residents) was associated with low levels of CD 
has important implications. Specifically, it underscores the strong negative impacts associated 
with the prison cycling process that appear to be absent when examining the natural movement 
of people from county to county.  However, it is possible that voluntary mobility (i.e. residential 
mobility) occurs when residents of more affluent counties move to counties with comparable 
levels of affluence, whereas residents of highly disadvantaged places lack the resources to move 
out of their current position.  
I also found a strong link between counties’ religious structure and disadvantage. 
Counties with higher levels of black CD had more congregations per capita compared to less 
disadvantaged counties. One possible explanation of this finding is that counties with fewer 
congregations may have religiously homogenous populations. More unified religious populations 
may allow congregations to more effectively mobilize resources needed to combat disadvantage. 
There was no evidence of a mediation effect, meaning that there was no support for Hypothesis 
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2.  However, the importance of congregation rates in mitigating the impact of CM on CD varies 
substantially across communities. Specifically, the mitigating effect congregation rate on CD 
was apparent in black and nonblack communities, thus providing support for Hypothesis 3. 
Moreover, counties with a substantial number of religious congregations provide more of the 
social capital necessary to mitigate the negative impact of coercive mobility.  
Hypothesis 4 was also confirmed in that the effect of CM on CD was stronger in more 
urban counties for both racial groups. Clear (2007) argues that one reason that coercive mobility 
is harmful to communities is that the communities that experience high rates of CM are often 
concentrated in poor places located in urban centers, and research finds evidence to support this 
(Sampson and Loeffler 2010; Clear et al. 2003; Fagan et al. 2003; Lynch and Sabol 2004b). 
These places lack formal and informal resources needed to combat the negative effects of 
removing relatively large segments of the population, and the subsequent return of ex-offenders 
back into the community. Thus, not only are urban centers more likely to suffer from a lack of 
resources, but they are also more likely to be disproportionately impacted by coercive mobility, 
which contributes to further disadvantage entrenchment.    
 Previous research that examined the relationship between race and disadvantage has 
examined the differences between racial groups regarding the impact of race-specific 
disadvantage on criminal outcomes (McNulty 2001). One feature that makes these types of 
comparisons difficult is the problem of “restrictive distributions,” or the tendency for blacks to 
fall on the high end of the disadvantage spectrum while whites tend to fall on the low end 
(McNulty 2001:468). Moreover, there is more variation at low levels of concentrated 
disadvantage, which generally occurs within nonblack populations, than high levels of 
concentrated disadvantage, which is more likely to occur in the black population. Thus, when 
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levels of concentrated disadvantage are high, further increases in disadvantage will occur at 
lower rates compared to groups that start with lower levels of disadvantage.  
My analyses provide evidence consistent with the notion of restrictive distributions. 
Interestingly, the effect of black CM on black CD was not significant when controlling for 
previous disadvantage. However, the effect of nonblack CM on nonblack CD was significant net 
of CD in 2000 and other predictors in 2010. It is possible that there was more variation in levels 
of nonblack CD at the county level than levels of black CD, thus the negative impact of CM was 
more evident when observing the nonblack population. 
Yet, this relationship changed when the interaction term of percent urban and black CM 
was introduced into the model. Moreover, the results in Model 4 in Table 4 indicate that although 
black CM in 2010 does not have a significant main effect on black CD in 2010 when controlling 
for prior disadvantage, the interaction term suggests that the effect of black CM on black CD is 
conditional on location, specifically the level of urbanity that occurs in the county. Again, the 
nonsignificant main effect is not surprising, in that the main effect would reflect the effect of CM 
in a county with no urban population, which is highly unlikely. Thus, I did find support for 
Hypothesis 4. Black coercive mobility is most harmful to urban places, a finding which aligns 
closely with arguments proposed by Clear (2007). African Americans are more likely to be 
concentrated in urban areas, and high rates of coercive mobility are more likely to occur in urban 
areas. Consequently, finding that the impact of coercive mobility on concentrated disadvantage 
for blacks is conditional on higher percentages of urban populations is somewhat expected, and 
coincides with previous research (Clear et al. 2001; Sampson and Loeffler 2010).   
In contrast to the findings for black CD, high rates of nonblack CM are associated with 
high levels of nonblack CD in 2010 net of prior disadvantage, and this relationship is not 
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conditional on a high percentage of urban populations at the county-level. Nonblack populations 
are less likely to be concentrated in urban places compared to black populations. In this line of 
reasoning, the impact of black CM on black CD is conditional on the degree of urbanity within a 
county. In other words, the effects of nonblack CM on nonblack CD occur more broadly because 
the nonblack population is more dispersed throughout the county, whereas the black population 
is more likely to be concentrated in specific areas of the county, thus the impact of black CM on 
black CD is conditional on an urban setting. 
My analyses also indicated that high rates of black violent arrest and a high percentage of 
the black population with less than a high school education were associated with high levels of 
black concentrated disadvantage net of previous disadvantage. These findings are to be expected 
given their theoretical relevance and prevalence in previous research. Unsurprisingly, black CD 
in 2000 was a significant predictor of black CD in 2010, suggesting structural disadvantage is 
likely to remain relatively stable or increase slightly over time.  
For the nonblack sample, high rates of violent arrest, high percentage of the nonblack 
population with less than a high education, large black populations, and large segments of the 
population residing in urban places were associated with high levels of nonblack CD in 2010 
controlling for nonblack CD in 2000. Again, these relationships are not surprising given their 
theoretical relevance as well as the prominence in previous studies. Similar to the results found 
for the black sample, nonblack CD in 2000 was positively associated with nonblack CD in 2010, 
suggesting that concentrated disadvantage was highly stable over time.  
The link between religious structures and concentrated disadvantage that was found in the 
cross sectional models was not as apparent in the longitudinal analysis. The rate of congregations 
was positively associated with concentrated disadvantage for both blacks and nonblacks. 
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However, the rate of congregations did not mitigate the deleterious effects of CM on CD once 
prior CD was incorporated into the models.  
The results of the change analysis provided very few significant relationships. This is 
likely due to the lack of variation within units, meaning that very little change occurred within 
counties over the 10 year period. Nonetheless, a few relationships remained significant for each 
racial group. First, in the black sample, counties with high rates of violent arrest increased levels 
of black CD over time. In in counties where low levels of education for African Americans 
remained high, the level of black CD increased from 2000 to 2010. Both violence and low levels 
of education have been shown to directly impact disadvantage. Previous research that examined 
violent crime has also demonstrated a strong positive relationship between disadvantage and 
violence (Sampson et al. 1997; McNulty 2001).  
Similar to the results found in previous models, the rate of congregations corresponded to 
increases in black and nonblack CD. Moreover, counties characterized by high levels of CD are 
likely to have more racially and/or ethnically diverse populations. More racial/ethnic diversity 
corresponds to more cultural diversity, which usually results in an assortment of religious 
affiliations. In other words, the fact that increases in CD for both racial groups was associated 
with more religious congregations was likely due to high levels of heterogeneity in people and 
culture found in disadvantage places. There was no evidence of a mediation effect of the rate of 
congregations on CM, thus there was no support for Hypothesis 2.  
For the black population, CD increased more in urban counties with high rates of CM 
compared to counties with low rates of CM, which is consistent with Hypothesis 4. For blacks, 
increases in CM leading to increases in CD are conditional on highly urban places. Black 
populations within counties are often times concentrated in urban communities. Research finds 
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that these black urban communities were disproportionally impacted by mass incarceration, and, 
consequently, coercive mobility (Clear et al. 2003; Sampson and Loeffler 2010; Fagan et al. 
2003; Lynch and Sabol 2004b). Thus, as proposed by Clear (2007), the effect of CM on CD 
matters more African Americans concentrated in urban settings because these areas are the most 
poorly resourced while also being subject to more scrutiny by the criminal justice system. 
In the nonblack sample, high rates of nonblack violent arrest, a high percentage of the 
nonblack population with less than a high school degree, a high percentage of the population that 
is a nonblack, male aged 15 to 29, large African American populations, and a high percentage of 
the population residing in urban areas were all associated with increased levels of nonblack CD 
over a 10 year period. The majority of these relationships were found in previous analyses, thus 
their presence in the change analysis points to the stability of these findings across different 
methods of analyses, as well as consistency over time.  
A. Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
This study has several limitations and opportunities for future research. One limitation 
concerns the modeling specification and assumptions. My models use OLS techniques, which 
allow for increases in CM to predict linear increases in disadvantage, and decreases in CM to 
predict decreases in disadvantage. However, it is important whether the relationship is linear, in 
that structural disadvantage is probably more likely to increase or remain stable than to decrease 
over time. One must consider unidirectionality and the persistence of CM effects, including the 
possibility that neighborhoods’ CD may not diminish in response to decreases in CM. Even after 
incarceration booms have declined, the harmful effects of significant increases in CM may 
persist as communities continue to struggle and/or further deteriorate. Our model cannot capture 
these possible effects, and thus may underestimate the true effect of CM. 
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Relatedly, the finding that CM was associated with nonblack CD but not black CD when 
accounting for previous CD is possibly related to recession effects. Black communities were 
more likely to be characterized by poverty and high rates of unemployment prior to the 
recession. Thus, the recession may have differentially affected black versus nonblack 
communities because economic downturns may not impact the chronically unemployed as much 
as the lower middle class and working poor. In other words, nonblacks may have sunk further 
and suffered more in 2010 relative to their economic position in 2000 than blacks did, because 
they had more potential for downward movement. 
The current study was also limited to available data. The data restricted the unit of 
analysis to the county, which was a larger spatial unit compared to units of analyses found in 
previous studies. The theoretical framework proposed by Rose and Clear (1998) discussed the 
collateral consequences of coercive mobility at the neighborhood level. Clear et al.’s (2003) later 
work tested their theory using neighborhoods in Tallahassee, Florida defined through Tallahassee 
Neighborhood Services, Census tracts, and block groups. Sampson and Loeffler (2010) used a 
similar approach to examine concentrated incarceration in communities in Chicago, Illinois. 
Comparable to Clear et al. (2003), communities in Chicago were defined using Census tracts. It 
is possible that the majority of the effects of coercive mobility on concentrated disadvantage 
occurs in relatively small spatial units, thus the aggregate effect is less visible at the county-level. 
 The data was also restricted to two points in time. Given that mass incarceration started 
gaining speed in the early 1980s, it is possible that the majority of the damaging effects that the 
prison cycling process had on communities occurred sometime during 1980 to 2000. Thus, the 
current study may have failed to capture the most tumultuous time period(s), and instead 
captured the later points of the cycle of coercive mobility and disadvantage in which substantial 
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damage had already been done. In other words, it is possible that the largest effects of coercive 
mobility on concentrated disadvantage, as proposed by Clear (2007), occurred earlier. 
Relatedly, changes in correctional policy as a response to mass incarceration were 
already taking place in many states during the 2000 to 2010 time period. In some places, rates of 
coercive mobility were already declining. These issues can be addressed in future analyses. In 
order to assess the consequences of coercive mobility over time, future research should include 
earlier and more frequent time periods, including those prior to start of the prison boom. 
This study provides the first known macro-level empirical test of the long-term effects of 
coercive mobility on community disadvantage. Scholars have determined that cumulative aspects 
of disadvantage operate in conjunction with one another to create criminogenic environments; 
this study complements the existing literature by documenting how the mass incarceration of 
residents of these environments may, in turn, contribute to disadvantage entrenchment. The 
policy response to crime was harsh penalties paid by individual offenders, and more formal 
social control in general. Not foreseen, perhaps, was the long-term impact this has had on the 
residents within crime-prone places. The current study points to how the overuse of formal social 
control reproduces the ecological characteristics that are conducive to crime (i.e. disadvantage). 
The analyses also revealed the importance of religious institutions as mechanisms of networking, 
capital, and informal social control that operate to mitigate the collateral consequences of 
coercive mobility. 
 These findings are informative for policy responses. Clear and colleagues call for 
sentencing reform focusing specifically on eliminating mandatory sentencing of some offenders 
(such as drug offenders) and shortening the sentence length of post-release supervision terms to 
reduce revocations and reduce mass imprisonment (2007). The effect of incarceration is not 
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limited to only punishing the individual, but instead weakens entire communities by cycling 
large proportions of the population through this destabilizing process (2007). The findings in the 
current study add to Clear’s argument by providing evidence that the overuse of incarceration 
over time depletes community resources leading to greater concentrated disadvantage. This 
underscores the failures of macro-level formal social controls in protecting communities, 
particularly urban communities, as justice system responses to crime hurt the places that needed 
them the most. 
 Consistent with Clear’s (2007) suggestions, this study highlights the need to re-evaluate 
our response to crime, with an emphasis on community justice programs in high incarceration 
places, specifically urban places (Clear 2007). One component of this is community-based 
reentry programs. Finding that faith-based organizations moderate the impact of coercive 
mobility on disadvantage implies that programs that focus on promoting sources of informal 
social control, such as churches, schools, youth groups, and other community organizations 
should be a key feature in justice reform. Perhaps the most effective proactive approach to 
reduce crime in disadvantaged areas is to provide these areas with resources that provide 
networking opportunities to build community capital. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics; N= 701 (Cont.) 
Note: Measures of public assistance are not race-specific. Centered variables are calculated as the mean of the logged variable 






B. Table 2a. Bivariate Correlations for Black Sample     
  2000 
    
CD 
PCA % CD  CM   Vio.  
 Res. 





PCA 1 .963** .209** .160** -.440** .386** -.171** .297** 0.053 .258** 
% CD  1 .165** .126** -.440** .495** -.184** .313** -0.024 .343** 
 CM 
Rate   1 .395** 0.027 -.139** .302** -.405** .349** -.171** 
 Vio.    1 -.083* -.102** .170** -.259** .219** -.140** 
 Res. 
Mob.     1 -.481** .537** -.551** .232** -.398** 
 Edu.      1 -.455** .452** -.438** .578** 
MCP       1 -.656** .359** -.327** 
 % Blk        1 .300** .330** 
 Urban         1 -.526** 







Table 2a. Bivariate Correlations for Black Sample (Cont.) 
2010 
CD PCA % CD  CM   Vio.   Res. Mob. Edu. MCP  % Black  Urban  Cong. 
.766** .770** .248** .219** -.249** .410** -0.069 .300** 0.010 .328** 
.763** .789** .230** .176** -.234** .506** -0.023 .314** -0.068 .403** 
.153** .135** .803** .402** 0.028 -.156** -0.043 -.402** .347** -.205** 
.174** .144** .363** .605** -0.043 -.105** -0.058 -.267** .227** -.136** 
-.405** -.425** 0.052 0.007 .733** -.476** .516** -.499** .240** -.472** 
.378** .407** -.086* -.136** -.281** .863** -0.046 .403** -.451** .591** 
-.176** -.186** .355** .239** .490** -.421** .463** -.659** .375** -.423** 
-.265** -.273** .424** .286** .370** -.408** .243** .984** .325** .467** 
-0.021 -0.020 .339** .308** .253** -.429** .107** -.276** .945** -.495** 








Table 2a. Bivariate Correlations for Black Sample (Cont.) 
2010 
CD PCA % CD  CM   Vio.   Res. Mob. Edu. MCP  % Black  Urban  Cong. 
1 .978** .201** .230** -.225** .444** -0.031 .238** -0.060 .405** 
 1 .188** .202** -.236** .468** -0.059 .276** -0.060 .432** 
  1 .423** .092* -.103** .080* -.473** .329** -.143** 
   1 0.035 -.125** 0.058 -.348** .310** -.175** 
    1 -.297** .603** -.439** .264** -.339** 
     1 -0.034 .436** -.450** .591** 
      1 -.386** .088* -.129** 
       1 .265** .424** 
        1 -.531** 








Table 2a. Bivariate Correlations for Black Sample (Cont.) 
*p< .05; **p< .01; N= 701                               
Note: Coercive mobility, violent arrest, and number of congregations are rates. Violent arrest,  residential mobility, education, % 
black,  and rate of congregations are log transformed. Coercive mobility and % urban are centered on their mean. Measures of % 


















C. Table 2b. Bivariate Correlations for Nonblack Sample        
  2000 
    
CD 
PCA % CD  CM   Vio.  
 Res. 




CD PCA 1 .964** .435** .360** -.324** .241** .139** -0.062 .112** .090* 
% CD  1 .405** .316** -.314** .353** .128** 0.025 0.02 .224** 
 CM 
Rate   1 .366** -.106** 0.071 -0.038 -.106** .197** 0.054 
 Vio.    1 -.187** 0.021 -0.064 -.125** .125** -0.049 
 Res. 
Mob.     1 -.249** 0.057 -0.002 -0.04 -.167** 
 Edu.      1 -.135** .705** -.493** .573** 
MCP       1 -.337** .076* -0.046 
 % 
Black        1 -.321** .330** 
 Urban         1 -.526** 








Table 2b. Bivariate Correlations for Nonblack Sample (Cont.)   
2010 
CD PCA % CD  CM   Vio.   Res. Mob. Edu. MCP  % Black  Urban  Cong. 
.724** .757** .448** .360** -0.022 .285** .281** -.090* .085* .105** 
.688** .770** .450** .325** -0.008 .290** .282** -0.011 -0.013 .241** 
.436** .447** .774** .345** 0.022 .336** .110** -.120** .193** 0.052 
.343** .312** .306** .505** -.123** .219** 0.021 -.154** .131** -0.043 
-.288** -.270** -.180** -.192** .704** -.159** .173** -0.007 0.006 -.194** 
.240** .321** .143** 0.046 -.113** -.078* -.083* .668** -.517** .649** 
.091* .104** 0.028 -0.032 .179** 0.047 .268** -.335** 0.057 -.097* 
-0.061 0.005 -.126** -.137** .106** -.277** -.146** .984** -.333** .467** 
.140** .091* .098** .125** .087* 0.017 .122** -.276** .945** -.495** 







Table 2b. Bivariate Correlations for Nonblack Sample (Cont.)   
2010 
CD PCA % CD  CM   Vio.   Res. Mob. Edu. MCP  % Black  Urban  Cong. 
1 .957** .449** .372** -.080* .351** .201** -.075* .133** .143** 
 1 .473** .349** -0.031 .380** .247** -0.018 .076* .261** 
  1 .318** -0.053 .397** .112** -.134** .087* .184** 
   1 -.102** .234** .098** -.142** .129** -0.063 
    1 -.155** .324** .105** .110** -.130** 
     1 0.02 -.302** 0.034 .125** 
      1 -.143** .124** -.099** 
       1 -.290** .424** 
        1 -.531** 








Table 2b. Bivariate Correlations for Nonblack Sample (Cont.) 
*p< .05; **p< .01; N= 701                           
Note: Coercive mobility, violent arrest, and number of congregations are rates. Violent arrest,  residential mobility, education, % 
black,  and rate of congregations are log transformed. Coercive mobility and % urban are centered on their mean. Measures of % 


























Model 3   Model 4 
Variable   b SE   b SE   b SE   b SE 










































Ln % Black 
 
0.284** 0.050  0.288** 0.050  0.301** 0.050  0.296** 0.050 


















-0.310** 0.080  -- -- 
CM*Urban -- --   -- --   -- --   0.201** 0.040 







Table 3a. OLS Regression of Concentrated Disadvantage in 2000 on Coercive Mobility and Other Predictors (Cont.) 
Nonblack 




Model 7   Model 8 
  b SE   b SE   b SE   b SE 



































































-0.269* 0.080  -- -- 
  -- --   -- --   -- --   0.178** 0.040 
  .389     .390     .401     .407   
















Model 3   Model 4 
Variable   b SE   b SE   b SE   b SE 










































Ln % Black 
 
0.316** 0.050  0.258** 0.050  0.259** 0.040  0.260** 0.040 


















-0.268** 0.070  -- -- 























Model 7   Model 8 




































































-0.288** 0.080  -- -- 





.352     .343   
 
Note: The dependent variable is PCA factor of concentrated disadvantage. Measures of coercive mobility and % urban are centered 
around their mean. Measures of % urban and number of congregations are not race specific. 







F. Table 4. OLS Regression of Concentrated Disadvantage in 2010 on Coercive Mobility and Other Predictors  












 Variable   b SE   b SE   b SE   b SE   
Constant -1.684** 0.303  -2.152** 0.310  -2.178** 0.311  -2.353** 0.312  
Centered CM 0.028 0.045  0.015 0.044  0.181 0.159  0.021 0.044  
Ln Vio. Arrest Rate 0.136** 0.036  0.144** 0.035  0.139* 0.035  0.129** 0.035  
Ln Res. Mobility -0.046 0.054  -0.023 0.053  -0.018 0.053  -0.021 0.053  
Ln Ed. Attainment 0.379** 0.071  0.263** 0.073  0.267* 0.073  0.291** 0.073  
Male Crime-Prone 0.008 0.008  0.007 0.007  0.007 0.007  0.007 0.007  
Ln % Black 
 
0.006 0.038  -0.018 0.037  -0.015 0.038  -0.007 0.037  
Centered % Urban -0.024 0.028  0.034 0.029  0.043 0.03  0.121* 0.038  
CD in 2000 0.656** 0.030  0.631** 0.030  0.625** 0.031  0.607** 0.031  
Ln Cong. Rate -- --  0.300** 0.055  0.306** 0.056  0.339** 0.056  
CM*Cong. Rate -- --  -- --  -0.061 0.056  -- --  
CM*Urban -- --   -- --   -- --   0.121** 0.034   
R2 
 







Table 4. OLS Regression of Concentrated Disadvantage in 2010 on Coercive Mobility and Other Predictors  
Controlling for Concentrated Disadvantage in 2000 (Cont.) 
Nonblack 







 b SE   b SE   b SE   b SE 
 -0.581* 0.225  -0.992** 0.258  -0.991** 0.258  -0.988** 0.258 
 0.152* 0.047  0.118* 0.048  0.278 0.18  0.117* 0.048 
 0.011* 0.003  0.012* 0.003  0.011* 0.004  0.012** 0.003 
 -0.174* 0.078  -0.144† 0.078  -0.147† 0.078  -0.138* 0.079 
 0.234** 0.051  0.203** 0.051  0.210** 0.052  0.197** 0.052 
 0.010 0.009  0.010 0.009  0.010 0.009  0.010 0.009 
 0.083* 0.029  0.040 0.032  0.042 0.032  0.038 0.032 
 0.082* 0.026  0.127** 0.029  0.133** 0.03  0.118** 0.031 
 0.605** 0.03  0.597** 0.03  0.592* 0.03  0.601** 0.03 
 -- --  0.189* 0.059  0.189* 0.059  0.190* 0.059 
 -- --  -- --  -0.058 0.063  -- -- 
 -- --   -- --   -- --   -0.028 0.037 
 .574     .581     .581     .581   
 Note: The dependent variable is concentrated disadvantage in 2010 calculated using PCA factor analysis. The measure of 
concentrated disadvantage in 2000 is also calculated using PCA factor analysis. All other independent variables are measured 
in 2010.  Measures of coercive mobility and % urban are centered on their means. Measures of religious congregations and 
percent urban are not race specific. 
    †p< .10; *p < .05; **p< .001; N= 701 









Appendix A. OLS Regression of Change in Concentrated Disadvantage from 2000 to 2010 on Change in Coercive Mobility  











Variable   b SE   b SE   b SE   b SE 
Constant 0.624 5.958  -12.149† 6.282  -12.025† 6.294  -11.906† 6.274 
Change in CM 0.009 0.008  0.003 0.008  0.017 0.038  -0.087† 0.053 
Ln Vio. Arrest Rate 2.545** 0.689  2.672** 0.675  2.675** 0.675  2.700** 0.674 
Ln Res. Mobility -0.822 1.056  -0.279 1.039  -0.256 1.041  -0.331 1.038 
Ln Ed. Attainment 5.301** 1.444  3.273* 1.462  3.271* 1.462  3.265* 1.459 
Male Crime-Prone -0.114 0.148  -0.117 0.145  -0.122 0.146  -0.113 0.144 
Ln % Black 0.608 0.637  0.217 0.628  0.199 0.630  0.209 0.627 
Ln % Urban 0.520 0.526  1.631* 0.554  1.631* 0.554  1.657* 0.553 
% CD in 2000 -0.088* 0.038  -0.130** 0.038  -0.129* 0.038  -0.131* 0.038 
Ln Cong. Rate -- --  6.026** 1.097  6.000** 1.099  5.970** 1.096 
Change CM*Cong. Rate 
-- --  -- --  -0.005 0.014  -- -- 
















Appendix A (Cont.) 
Appendix A. OLS Regression of Change in Concentrated Disadvantage from 2000 to 
2010 on Change in Coercive Mobility  Controlling for Concentrated Disadvantage in 
2000 and Other Predictors in 2010 (Cont.)                 











  b SE   b SE   b SE   b SE 
 0.935 1.613  -4.818* 1.889  -4.722* 1.912  -5.223* 1.966 
 0.005 0.016  -0.013 0.016  -0.04 0.083  0.038 0.069 
 0.073* 0.023  0.085** 0.022  0.085** 0.022  0.085** 0.022 
 -0.568 0.526  -0.244 0.518  -0.236 0.519  -0.222 0.519 
 2.392** 0.335  2.016** 0.335  2.019** 0.335  2.012** 0.335 
 0.133* 0.062  0.142* 0.061  0.143* 0.061  0.141* 0.061 
 0.721** 0.197  0.244 0.211  0.244 0.211  0.236 0.211 
 0.658** 0.174  1.143** 0.191  1.143** 0.191  1.231** 0.224 
 -0.218** 0.031  -0.258** 0.031  -0.259** 0.031  -0.258** 0.031 
 -- --  2.219** 0.400  2.179** 0.418  2.241** 0.401 
 -- --  -- --  0.009 0.028  -- -- 






.170     .171   
Note: The dependent variable is the change in concentrated disadvantage from 2000 to 2010. The measures of concentrated 
disadvantage  are calculated as the sum of % poverty, % unemployed, % female-headed homes, and % public assistance. Change in 
coercive mobility is calculated as the difference between CM in 2000 and CM in 2010. All independent variables except CM and 
CD are measured in 2010. Measures of the rate of religious congregations and percent urban are not race specific. 
 †p< .10; *p < .05; **p< .001; N= 701 







Appendix B. OLS Regression of Concentrated Disadvantage in 2010 on Coercive Mobility, Drug Arrest 













Variable   b SE   b SE   b SE   b SE 
Constant -1.243* 0.526  -1.350* 0.519  -1.246** 0.275  -1.230** 0.273 
Coercive Mobility 0.081* 0.045  0.065 0.044  0.182** 0.047  0.164* 0.047 
Ln Drug Crime Rate -0.002 0.034  -0.080* 0.037  -0.040 0.036  -0.077* 0.037 
Ln Residential Mobility -0.057 0.055  -0.045 0.054  -0.196 0.078  -0.17* 0.078 
Ln Ed. Attainment 0.354** 0.070  0.375** 0.069  0.248** 0.051  0.240** 0.051 
Male Crime-Prone 0.010 0.007  0.010 0.007  0.011 0.009  0.010 0.009 
Ln % Nonblack -0.048 0.120  -0.090 0.119  -- --  -- -- 
Ln % Black -- --  -- --  0.075* 0.029  0.075* 0.029 
Ln % Urban -0.006 0.029  -0.010 0.028  0.097** 0.027  0.095** 0.026 
CD in 2000 0.671** 0.030  0.635** 0.031  0.627** 0.029  0.602** 0.03 










 Note: The dependent variable is concentrated disadvantage in 2010 calculated using PCA factor analysis. The 
measure of concentrated disadvantage in 2000 is also calculated using PCA factor analysis. All other independent 
variables are measured in 2010.  Measures of religious congregations and percent urban are not race specific. 












Appendix C. OLS Regression of Concentrated Disadvantage in 2010 on Coercive Mobility, Adherence Rates, 










Variable   b SE   b SE   b SE 
Constant -1.224* 0.517  -1.279* 0.521  -4.217 2.455 
Coercive Mobility 0.046 0.043  0.040 0.044  -0.363 0.332 
Ln Violent Crime Rate 0.142** 0.035  0.142** 0.035  0.141** 0.035 
Ln Residential Mobility -0.040 0.054  -0.032 0.055  -0.025 0.055 
Ln Ed. Attainment 0.374** 0.069  0.366* 0.070  0.362** 0.070 
Male Crime-Prone 0.009 0.007  0.009 0.007  0.009 0.007 
Ln % Nonblack -0.136 0.117  -0.132 0.117  -0.129 0.117 
Ln % Black -- --  -- --  -- -- 
Ln % Urban -0.024 0.028  -0.028 0.028  -0.033 0.028 
CD in 2000 0.644** 0.030  0.642** 0.031  0.640** 0.031 
Ln Adherence Rates    0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
Ln Interaction (CM * 















Appendix C (Cont.) 
Appendix C. OLS Regression of Concentrated Disadvantage in 2010 on Coercive Mobility, Adherence Rates, 





Model 4 Model 5 
 
Model 6 
  b SE b SE   b SE 
 -1.368** 0.266 -1.219** 0.271  -0.432 0.604 
 0.152* 0.047 0.181** 0.048  0.319* 0.106 
 0.011* 0.003 0.010* 0.003  0.010* 0.003 
 -0.174* 0.078 -0.211* 0.079  -0.226* 0.080 
 0.234** 0.051 0.232** 0.051  0.238** 0.051 
 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.009  0.010 0.009 
 -- -- -- --  -- -- 
 0.083* 0.029 0.099* 0.030  0.103* 0.030 
 0.082* 0.026 0.095** 0.026  0.102** 0.027 
 0.605** 0.03 0.601** 0.030  0.595** 0.03 
   < - .01* 0.000  < - .01 0.000 







 Note: The dependent variable is concentrated disadvantage in 2010 calculated using PCA factor analysis. The measure of concentrated 
disadvantage in 2000 is also calculated using PCA factor analysis. All other independent variables are measured in 2010.  Measures of 
religious adherence rates and percent urban are not race specific.  








Appendix D. OLS Regression of Concentrated Disadvantage in 2010 on Coercive Mobility, Black Protestant Adherence 










 Variable   b SE   b SE   b SE   
Constant -1.454* 0.520  -2.342** 0.655  -2.196* 0.664  
Coercive Mobility 0.057 0.045  0.069 0.045  0.036 0.051  
Ln Violent Crime Rate 0.158** 0.036  0.162** 0.036  0.164** 0.036  
Ln Residential Mobility -0.008 0.056  0.021 0.058  0.024 0.058  
Ln Ed. Attainment 0.434** 0.072  0.404** 0.073  0.406** 0.073  
Male Crime-Prone 0.004 0.008  0.007 0.008  0.006 0.008  
Ln % Nonblack -0.136 0.117  -0.018 0.128  0.003 0.129  
Ln % Black -- --  -- --  -- --  
Ln % Urban -0.041 0.030  -0.038 0.029  -0.040 0.029  
CD in 2000 0.620** 0.032  0.610** 0.032  0.615** 0.032  
Ln Black Prot. Adh. -- --  0.057* 0.026  0.032 0.032  
Interaction (CM * 
















Appendix D  (Cont.) 
Appendix D. OLS Regression of Concentrated Disadvantage in 2010 on Coercive Mobility, Black Protestant Adherence 
Rates, and Other Predictors  Controlling for Concentrated Disadvantage in 2000 (Cont.)   
Nonblack 





b SE   b SE   b SE 
-1.235** 0.281  -1.270** 0.291  -1.420** 0.316 
0.170** 0.048  0.169** 0.048  0.202** 0.055 
0.009* 0.004  0.009* 0.004  0.009* 0.004 
-0.165* 0.082  -0.162* 0.082  -0.169* 0.082 
0.224** 0.053  0.221** 0.053  0.214** 0.053 
0.007 0.010  0.008 0.01  0.008 0.010 
-- --  -- --  -- -- 
0.072* 0.031  0.055 0.048  0.053 0.048 
0.053† 0.029  0.055† 0.029  0.056† 0.029 
0.588** 0.032  0.587** 0.032  0.585** 0.032 
-- --  0.014 0.031  0.036 0.035 






 Note: The dependent variable is concentrated disadvantage in 2010 calculated using PCA factor analysis. The measure of concentrated 
disadvantage in 2000 is also calculated using PCA factor analysis. All other independent variables are measured in 2010.  Measures of 
religious adherence rates and percent urban are not race specific.  





Appendix E. IRB Protocol Approval Form 
 
 
MEMORANDUM        April 21, 2015 
TO: Megan Handley 
 Mindy Bradley 
 
FROM: Ro Windwalker 
 IRB Coordinator 
 
RE: New Protocol Approval 
 
IRB Protocol #: 15-03-639 
 
Protocol Title: Concentrated Disadvantage and Coercive Mobility: A Longitudinal 
Analysis of the Impact of Coercive Mobility 
 
Review Type:  EXEMPT  EXPEDITED  FULL IRB 
 
Approved Project Period: Start Date: 04/20/2015  Expiration Date:  04/19/2016 
 
Your protocol has been approved by the IRB.  Protocols are approved for a maximum period of 
one year.  If you wish to continue the project past the approved project period (see above), you 
must submit a request, using the form Continuing Review for IRB Approved Projects, prior to the 
expiration date.  This form is available from the IRB Coordinator or on the Research Compliance 
website (https://vpred.uark.edu/units/rscp/index.php).  As a courtesy, you will be sent a reminder 
two months in advance of that date.  However, failure to receive a reminder does not negate 
your obligation to make the request in sufficient time for review and approval.  Federal 
regulations prohibit retroactive approval of continuation.  Failure to receive approval to continue 
the project prior to the expiration date will result in Termination of the protocol approval.  The 
IRB Coordinator can give you guidance on submission times. 
If you wish to make any modifications in the approved protocol, you must seek approval prior to 
implementing those changes.  All modifications should be requested in writing (email is 
acceptable) and must provide sufficient detail to assess the impact of the change. 
If you have questions or need any assistance from the IRB, please contact me at 109 MLKG 
Building, 5-2208, or irb@uark.edu. 
109 MLKG • 1 University of Arkansas • Fayetteville, AR 72701-1201 • (479) 575-2208 • Fax (479) 575-6527 • Email 
irb@uark.edu 
The University of Arkansas is an equal opportunity/affirmative action institution. 
  
Office of Research Compliance  
Institutional Review Board 
 
87 
 
 
 
 
88 
 
 
 
 
89 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
90 
 
 
 
91 
 
 
 
 
92 
 
